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ABSTRACT 
Advertising and Consumer Search 
in Differentiated Markets. (August 2005) 
Kevin Kenton Harriott, B.Sc.; M.Sc., University of the West Indies, Jamaica 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Hae-Shin Hwang 
This dissertation, in its most general context, is an investigation into the 
modeling of markets with imperfectly informed agents.  In such markets, there will 
invariably be incentives for informed agents to take advantage of information 
asymmetries by disseminating the relevant information to uninformed agents.  Similarly, 
there will be incentives for uniformed agents to reduce the adverse effects of information 
asymmetries by acquiring the relevant information.  The primary purpose of this 
dissertation is to demonstrate that the understanding of such markets can be greatly 
enhanced by explicit modeling both channels of information flow as omitting either 
channel could eliminate important interaction effects. 
The arguments in this dissertation are narrowly framed within a familiar 
differentiated market in which firms advertise and each consumer is imperfectly 
informed about which product is most suited to his taste.  However, the conclusions 
drawn in the dissertation are applicable to more general economic systems in which it is 
costly for agents to acquire information relevant to the decision-making process. 
There is a long-standing debate in the literature about whether or not advertising 
is purely informative.  Although there is extensive research on advertising models and 
consumer search models, little is known about differentiated markets in which firms 
advertise and consumers search.  In modeling advertising and consumer search, this 
dissertation questions the relevance of two pieces of evidence that have been offered 
against the view that advertising is informative. 
In the first instance, I demonstrate that firms may use purely informative 
advertising and still maintain market power in the long-run in monopolistically 
   iv
competitive markets; this finding thus rejects the argument that firms rely on 
manipulating consumer preferences in order to maintain market power in these markets.  
In the second instance, I demonstrate that advertisements without any information about 
the product being advertised may still be informative to some consumers; this finding 
thus rejects the argument that the widespread use of uninformative television 
advertisements is inconsistent with the view that advertising is informative in nature. 
This dissertation shows that our understanding of the nature of advertising 
(information dissemination mechanism) is greatly enhanced by modeling consumer 
search (information acquisition mechanism). 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation demonstrates the benefits derived from explicitly modeling both 
channels of information flow in markets characterized by imperfect information.  
Specifically, I model an oligopolistic market characterized by imperfectly informed 
consumers with heterogeneous preferences for the products.  There are two channels 
through which information may flow in a market: informative advertising and consumer 
search.  Within the context of differentiated markets analyzed in this research, I show the 
information dissemination mechanism (advertising technology) plays a greater role than 
the information acquisition mechanism (consumer search technology) in shaping the 
decentralized market equilibrium. The simultaneous modeling of advertising and 
consumer search enriches our understanding of the nature of advertising by capturing its 
interactive effects with consumer search. 
There is a long-standing debate on the effect of advertising on the performance of 
the market.  The traditional view of advertising maintains that advertising is used by 
firms to retard the otherwise competitive forces in a market; supporters of this view label 
advertising of this nature as combative, persuasive or goodwill advertising.  The modern 
view maintains that advertising is pro-competitive in nature as it assuages the friction 
generated by information asymmetries among market participants; supporters of the 
modern view have labeled advertising of this nature as informative advertising.  In 
Chapters III and IV, I re-examine two of the arguments that have been offered in support 
of the traditional view of advertising. 
 
 
 
______ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the RAND Journal of Economics. 
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In Chapter III, I explore whether the use of purely informative advertising is 
consistent with long-run equilibrium in a truly monopolistically competitive market; the 
economists who developed this market structure intimated that only persuasive 
advertising could prevail because firms maintained market power despite competing in a 
large market. 
In chapter IV, I examine the issue of whether the amount of information in an 
advertisement can adequately determine the informativeness of the advertisement.  This 
is an important analysis given the sizeable proportion of television commercials that 
(seemingly) provides no relevant product information.  I show the use of commercials 
with no brand specific information is not necessarily inconsistent with the modern view 
of advertising as a pro-competitive marketing device.  
Economists have been curious about the underlying factors that would generate a 
monopolistically competitive market since the theoretical market structure was 
independently advanced by Chamberlin and Joan Robinson.  The main feature of the 
market structure is that an arbitrarily large number of firms competing with horizontally 
differentiated products maintain market power while earning normal profits in the long 
run.  The main object of curiosity in this market structure, as postulated, was the source 
of the market power firms are able maintain even as the number of firms operating in the 
market arbitrarily expanded.1  The theory of monopolistic competition sparked a debate 
on the role of advertisement in the performance of the market.  It is the contention of 
Joan Robinson (and Chamberlin, to a lesser extent) that each firm uses advertising to 
attach consumers to its product by unduly influencing consumer preferences.   
Joan Robinson is one of many economists who subscribes to the traditional view 
that advertising is persuasive by design and socially undesirable since it is an anti-
competitive tool used to reduce the perceived substitutability among products.  This 
                                                 
1 Market power is defined as the ability of firms to charge prices in excess of the marginal cost of 
production. 
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view seems unacceptable to economic theorists since it relies on the assumption that 
consumers are irrational and capable of being unduly influenced by firms. 
With the formal introduction of imperfect information into mainstream 
economics in the 1960s, a modern view of the role of advertising emerged.  The modern 
view argues that advertisements promote greater substitutability among products by 
subsidizing the cost of information acquisition and is consequently a competitive tool to 
be socially desired.  The modern view is more acceptable since it relies on consumer 
ignorance as opposed to consumer irrationality [See Bagwell (2004) for a more complete 
treatment of the modern and traditional views of advertising]. 
 Despite the relative success of the modern view in countering the arguments of 
the traditional view of advertising, the use of informative advertising seems to be 
inconsistent with the features of a truly monopolistically competitive market.  If we 
accept the modern view of the informative role of advertising, an immediate question 
arises in relation to the theory of monopolistically competitive markets.    Under what 
conditions, if any, could firms use informative advertising and maintain market power in 
differentiated product markets with unlimited entry?  A related question is, if advertising 
isn’t the source of market power, from where else could it be derived?  The questions 
arise because if in fact the use of advertising promotes greater substitutability among 
products, then firms should lose all market power in the limit as arbitrarily large number 
substitutable products enter the industry, in contradiction to the long run equilibrium 
conditions in monopolistically competitive markets. 
Many of the advertisements observed in the various media do not convey 
complete product information [See references cited in Anderson and Renault (2004) for 
empirical studies on the issue]. Some have held up these “uninformative” advertisements 
as evidence that firms attempt to manipulate consumer preferences as opposed to 
reducing information asymmetries. 
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  Resnik and Stern (1977) quote a former head of Consumer Protection at the 
Federal Trade Commission saying:  
 
Those forms of advertising which are essentially non-informative in 
character may raise questions as to their fundamental conformity with 
[the modern view of advertising]…and the extent to which such 
advertising is designed to exploit such fears or anxieties as social 
acceptance or personal wellbeing without fulfilling the desires raised. 
 
In Chapter IV, I address the sentiments addressed in the quote: is the use of “non-
informative” advertisements consistent with the modern views of advertising? 
Alternatively, is there any merit to the claim that the use of uninformative 
advertisements provides substantial evidence in support of the view that advertising has 
an anti-competitive effect on the performance of the market?  Another issue addressed in 
this dissertation is whether there is any theoretical underpinning for the observed 
predominant use of “non-informative” advertisements given that consumer preferences 
are not manipulated. 
I argue the information content of an advertisement in and of itself can not be 
used to assess the effect of advertising on the performance of the market.  In Chapter IV, 
I present a model that is most favorable to the anti-competitive view: that is advertising 
with no brand-specific information.  I do not question whether there are instances when 
advertising may have anti-competitive effects. The point I argue is that advertising 
content is an inadequate means of evaluating the effect of an advertising regime on the 
performance of the market.  
To reconcile the modern view of advertising with advertisements that lack brand-
specific information, I make the distinction between the costs of becoming aware of 
product characteristics as opposed to becoming aware of the unique characteristics of the 
various brands.  I assume the cost of learning about product characteristics (discovery) is 
   5
considerably greater than the cost of learning about brand characteristics (search).  I 
argue television commercials without any brand-specific information may be 
informative in the sense that they alert the consumer to general characteristics (e.g., 
existence and intended use) of the product. 
I make the distinction between two types of information acquisition costs faced 
by consumers.  Product search cost (henceforth, discovery cost) refers to the cost of 
learning the general characteristics of a class of products (e.g. Personal Computers); I 
argue that every advertisement convey this information to consumers.  Brand search cost 
(henceforth, search cost) refers to the cost of learning about the idiosyncratic features of 
each brand within a product class (e.g. Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Apple); this information 
is only conveyed in informative advertisements from a specific firm.  I find that 
discovery cost is of greater import than search cost in the firm’s decision on how much 
information to disclose in advertisements.  Most papers modeling consumer search 
consider only brand search cost. 
In Chapter II, I present a survey of papers that have examined markets in which 
agents are imperfectly informed in differentiated markets and focus on the channels of 
information explicitly examined.  I develop a general n firm model of imperfect markets 
in Chapter III.  In this model, firms disseminate advertisements to consumers with 
heterogeneous preferences.  Consumers in my model also search for the product most 
suited to their tastes.  The explicit modeling of consumer search with heterogeneous 
information sets represents an innovation over extant consumer search models of 
differentiated products. This innovation allows me to demonstrate that while the 
maintenance of market power under unlimited entry is consistent with the use of 
informative advertising, it crucially depends on the nature of advertising technology.  I 
find when initial marginal efforts to advertise is costless, firms lose all market power 
with unlimited entry but when initial advertising effort is costly, firms maintain market 
power even with unlimited entry. 
In Chapter IV, I use a duopoly version of my general model to assess the 
adequacy of using advertising content to measure the informativeness of advertising.  
   6
The crucial feature in this chapter is the distinction between discovery and search costs.  
In Chapter V, I summarize the main findings of the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
In this dissertation, I take the more favorable view of advertising and explore its 
implications for the empirical relevance of monopolistically competitive markets; that is, 
advertisements in our model do not alter consumer preference for the product 
advertised.2  Proponents of both the traditional and modern views of advertising 
recognize that markets operate under imperfect information.  They advance their opinion 
on the role of advertising using models that fail to account for both active channels of 
information flows.  The main purpose of this dissertation is to highlight the benefits to 
be gained from modeling both active channels of information flow.  Along the way, I 
develop a model of consumer search that incorporates consumers with heterogeneous 
prior information sets and make a significant contribution to the ongoing debate about 
the role of advertising in economics. 
Attempts to model imperfect information within a theoretical framework have 
been a part of the economics literature since the seminal work of Stigler (1961).  Within 
these studies, a consumer makes decisions based on incomplete information since 
gathering all the required information is too expensive (search models).  Consumers may 
also passively obtain information from firms (advertising models).  Most models of 
imperfect information focus on only one of these channels of information flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 A few studies [Tremblay (2001), Tremblay and Martins-Filho (2001), Bloch and Manceau (1999), von 
der Fehr and Stevik (1998) and Dixit and Norman (1978, 1979, 1980)] posit that firms use advertising to 
influence the perceived desirability of the advertised good to consumers.  We make no such assertion in 
this paper.   
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In what follows, I organize the literature on imperfect information by the 
channels on information explicitly modeled.  I show the majority of these studies are 
partial analyses of imperfect information markets in the sense they fail to explicitly 
incorporate the incentives of the informed agents to disseminate information (supply side 
analysis) and the incentives of the uninformed agents to acquire information (demand 
side analysis). 
 
2.1. Advertising Models 
The supply-side of the market for product information is examined in advertising 
models.  The focus of advertising models has been predominantly confined to exploring 
the role of advertising and examining whether or not a decentralized market would 
devote the efficient amount resources to inform consumers.  Our research is more 
closely related to papers that view advertisements as being purely informative [Butters 
(1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Stegeman (1991)].  When goods are 
homogenous, Butters (1977) shows advertising is optimal but Stegeman shows that 
advertising is undersupplied.  For differentiated products, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) 
show advertising levels are socially excessive with greater product diversity.  The model 
in Chapter III is developed by appending consumer search technology to the model 
envisioned by Grossman and Shapiro where consumer search is precluded.  Surprisingly, 
long-run equilibrium strategies are identical in both models suggesting firms are not 
influenced by the ability of consumers to search.  In Chapter III, I offer an explanation 
for this invariance of equilibrium strategies to consumer search.   
 
2.2. Search Models 
The demand-side issues of the market for product information, studied in 
consumer search models, have focused largely on characterizing the effects of search 
costs on price dispersion and the performance of the market [Anderson and Renault 
(1999, 2000), Fischer and Harrington (1996), Stahl (1994, 1996) and Diamond (1971)].  
My research examines symmetric, pure strategies in Bertrand competition and so price 
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dispersion (mixed strategies behavior) is ruled out as an equilibrium outcome.  Wolinsky 
(1986) unwittingly bolstered the evidence in favor of the modern view of advertising by 
making an important contribution to the theory of monopolistic competition.  He 
provides an alternative source of market power by developing a consumer search model 
for a differentiated product market in which firms do not advertise.  He shows that 
search activities of imperfectly informed consumers could generate a truly 
monopolistically competitive market.  Although Wolinsky’s study shows that 
advertising is not central to the theoretical underpinnings of monopolistically 
competitive markets, its major deficiency with regard to this dissertation is that it could 
not address the issue of whether the use of informative advertising is consistent with 
monopolistic competition.  
Given that the use of advertising is a prominent feature of many industries, it 
suggests Wolinsky’s model of imperfect information lacks an important component that 
would allow consumers to have information prior to search and allow firms to maintain 
market power.  Indeed, once the advertising mechanism is explicitly modeled alongside 
the search mechanism whereby the number of consumers with prior information is 
endogenously determined, Chapter III provides conditions under which the 
monopolistically competitive environment is restored.  In deriving these conditions, I 
generalize the search model developed by Wolinsky by incorporating consumers with 
heterogeneous prior information sets. 
 
2.3. Advertising and Search Models 
I use a simple model for simultaneously examining demand and supply in the 
market for information.  In this regard, models of advertising and consumer search such 
as Konish and Sandhort (2002) and Anderson and Renault (2004), Robert and Stahl 
(1993) and Butters (1977) are closer in spirit to my set up.  In Konish and Sandhort 
(2002) with horizontally differentiated products, advertising only conveys information 
about the price of the product.  This would be uninformative in our paper since 
consumers do not search for prices in our model; they rationally anticipate the 
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equilibrium price of the products and search instead for the product more suited to their 
taste.  In order for an advertisement to be informative in our model, it must convey some 
information about match value.  Butters (1977) finds that advertising level is inadequate 
when consumers search but the conclusion was reached when consumers engage in a 
sub-optimal search strategy where as I model consumers with an optimal search strategy. 
The model in Robert and Stahl is very close to the one developed in Chapter III.  
It is the first to model optimal consumer search behavior in an advertising model.  Their 
research shows advertising technology plays a greater role than consumer search 
technology in determining the equilibrium.  I also discover asymmetric effects between 
advertising and consumer search technology. The main point of departure between their 
model and the one outline in Chapter III is that I consider differentiated products while 
they considered homogenous products.   
My model is a hybrid of advertising models developed in Grossman and Shapiro 
(1984) and Robert and Stahl (1993).  In my model, products are differentiated and firm 
advertising is modeled along with consumer search.  In Grossman and Shapiro, 
consumer search is explicitly prohibited and in Robert and Stahl, goods are homogenous.  
A comparison of results from these studies with my results suggests neither consumer 
search behavior nor product heterogeneity are as important as advertising technology in 
the performance of markets with many firms.  In large markets, the pricing strategy 
uncovered in Chapter III is identical to that outlined in Grossman and Shapiro suggesting 
that the inclusion of search in our model does not affect the pricing strategy of the firms.  
I also find that in large markets, the advertising technology determines whether 
equilibrium price is competitive or monopolistic.  This is also a finding of Robert and 
Stahl and suggests that the homogenous product assumption is not crucial to this result. 
Marshall, Chamberlin and Robinson were the early proponents of the traditional 
view of advertising [See references cited in Bagwell (2004) for the works of these and 
other proponents of the traditional view of advertising].  They argue advertisements that 
convey no direct economic information represent attempts by firms to manipulate the 
preferences of unsuspecting consumers. 
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  This view is not widely accepted in mainstream economics since it relies on the 
irrationality of consumer behavior.  Another explanation, grounded in rational consumer 
behavior, is that the use of uninformative advertisements conveys indirect information 
by signaling to the consumers that the product is of high quality [Nelson (1974), and 
Milgrom and Roberts (1986)].  Of course, this explanation is only appropriate in 
vertically differentiated markets where products differ in quality.  An explanation for 
this lack of informative advertising in horizontally differentiated markets is noticeable 
absent from the previous literature and is the focus of Chapter IV. 
The explanation offered in this dissertation is grounded in the cost of information 
acquisition.  As alluded to in Comanor and Wilson (1974), any advertisement will at 
least inform the consumer of intended use of the product class.  Even if no brand-
specific information is included, information regarding the existence of the product class 
is useful to consumers who find it prohibitively expensive to acquire the information on 
their own. I formally model this feature in my research; as I show in Chapter IV, this is a 
crucial feature in generating an equilibrium in which firms advertise. 
My research presented in Chapter IV, is related to the research of Anderson and 
Renault (2004).  They consider a monopoly market and examine the incentives to the 
firm to supply information about the price and product characteristics to consumers. In 
their study, the firm advertises to all consumers, but decides on the price and content of 
the advertisements.  I consider a Duopoly market where firms decide the amount of 
information, the price and the number of consumers to inform. Both studies conclude 
that more product specific information will be disclosed in advertisements when 
information acquisition cost is sufficiently high.  However, Anderson and Renault 
(2004) focus on search cost while I focus on discovery cost.  
 
2.4. Advertising Intensities in Real Markets 
Empirically, promotional activities are important aspects of firms in a wide 
cross-section of industries. It has been argued that the promotion of a product is as 
important to the success of a firm as the attributes of the product itself; advertising is big 
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business.  During 2003, firms in industries with the top 100 advertising budgets spent 
resources equivalent to, on average, to 9.6 percent of their profit margins.3  The 
advertising to margin ratio varies starkly by industry. Industries with the highest margins 
include health services (83.6 percent), Household Audio and Video equipment (44.9 
percent), Distilled and Blended Liquor (43.7 percent) and Loan Brokers (43.2 percent).  
This is in contrast to the relatively low ratios reported by agricultural products (crops), 
Commercial Printing, Petroleum Refining and Refuse Systems, all of which reported a 
ratio below 1 percent during 2003. 
The top six advertising agencies generated $1.82 billion in revenues in the ME 
during 2003.  The next 100 highest ranked advertising entities generated $2,946 billion 
during 2003, a 6.32 percent increase over 2002.  The means of advertising is just as 
telling.  The top 100 media houses (a sub-group of advertising agencies) generated 
$179.65 billion in 2003; $34.26 billion (19.07 percent) through newspaper, $14.90 
billion (8.03 percent) through magazine, $32.86 billion (18.29 percent) through TV, 
$10.08 billion (5.61 percent) through radio, $59.77 billion (33.27 percent) through cable 
and $27.79 billion (15.47 percent) was generated via the Internet. 
The documented importance of advertising in actual markets therefore justifies 
our curiosity in developing richer theoretical models of advertising to aid in our 
understanding of how these considerable expenditures on advertising might be affecting 
the performance of these markets. 
 
                                                 
3 Profit margin is calculated as net sales minus cost of goods sold.  All data on advertising expenditures are 
taken from Advertising Age (2004). 
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CHAPTER III 
ADVERTISING IN MONOPOLISTICALLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS WHEN 
CONSUMERS SEARCH 
This model is a hybrid of advertising models developed in Grossman and Shapiro 
(1984) and Robert and Stahl (1993).  In this model, brands are differentiated and firm 
advertising is modeled along with consumer search.  In Grossman and Shapiro, 
consumer search is explicitly prohibited and in Robert and Stahl, goods are homogenous. 
A description of the general model is provided in Section 3.1.  In Section 3.2, 
firm’s expected demand is derived based on heterogeneity in consumers’ information 
set; strict attention is paid to how the consumer’s buying decision is influenced by their 
information available prior to search.  In Section 3.4, I endogenize heterogeneity in 
consumer information sets by incorporating informative advertising in the consumer 
search model.  A discussion of results is included in Section 3.5.  The chapter concludes 
in Section 3.6.     
 
3.1. General Model 
To fix ideas, I discuss the market for personal computers (PCs).  The computers 
may be purchased at one of n firms.  The PCs are identically designed with respect to 
processing speed, storage capacity, graphics capabilities etc., but each firm specializes in 
different colors.  Firms are identical in every other respect.  Consumers have no idea of 
the cost of the computers.  More importantly to the discussion, not all consumers know 
which color computer best would appeal to his taste. 
Each consumer purchases at most one PC (unit demand).  He may learn how well 
a particular color computer is suited to his taste in one of two ways.  The first involves 
traveling to the firm to view the computer on the display shelf.  The effort involved in 
traveling to the store exacts a negative utility, c, which I henceforth refer to as his search 
cost.  The other way involves receiving an advertisement brochure from the firm with a 
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colored picture of the computer.  It is assumed the brochure is sufficiently informative to 
allow the individual to learn his taste for that particular color computer.  This assessed 
value is referred to as his match value for that color (brand) PC.  Each consumer strictly 
prefers buying a computer to not buying any at all (perfectly inelastic demand). 
The results of this paper are applicable to a much broader market environment.  
Products sold by rival firms could be differentiated along an attribute other than color.  
The essential features of the PC market are that firms compete on prices, the products 
are purely horizontally differentiated, each consumer demands exactly one unit of the 
good and at least some of the consumers must have no prior idea of his match value or 
the price of the product; this information must be costly to send as well as to acquire. 
 
3.1.1. Extensive Form Description of the Model 
 There are three stages }2,1,0{  and three sets of players in this game: Nature, n  
firms ( nk ,,2,1 K= ) and a continuum of consumers, ]1,0[∈i .4  In Stage 0, Nature 
assigns each consumer with a match value for each brand.  The specific assignment of 
match values to consumer is neither observed by consumer nor firm. However, it is 
common knowledge that the distribution of match values for each product is given by 
the continuous and twice differentiable cumulative distribution F on ],[ ba which is 
identically and independently distributed (iid) across products. 
 In Stage 1, firms simultaneously choose price ),0[ ∞∈kp  and advertising 
intensity ]1,0[∈kφ .  The payoffs of actions taken by the firms is realized is Stage 2 and 
represented by the expected profit function kπ . 
In Stage 2, a consumer decides which store to visit and which brand to purchase.  
Consumers must buy one unit of the good from one of the firms and payoffs are given by 
his (indirect) utility function iv , minus search costs.  It is common knowledge that there 
are only n brands available in the market and that consumers search sequentially with 
                                                 
4 The terms firm, brand and store are identical concepts in this dissertation and are used interchangedly 
throughout. 
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perfect recall.  At the beginning of Stage 2, consumers know their match value and price 
of a brand if and only if an advertisement is received from the firm in Stage 1.  A visit to 
a store is sufficient for the consumer to learn his specific match value for that brand in 
addition to the price. 
 
3.1.2. Equilibrium Concept 
The equilibrium concept used in this model is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
Within the context of this model, I look for symmetric pure strategies in p and φ .  It 
requires that each firm choose price and advertising intensity to maximize his own 
payoffs (expected profits) based on firm’s beliefs about its rivals’ strategies as well as its 
knowledge of consumers’ search strategy in Stage 2.  It further requires consumers to 
buy a brand to maximize net indirect utility based on the information (if any) obtained 
from firms in Stage 1, as well as information obtained during the search process while 
anticipating the price charged by firms from which they did not receive an advertising 
message.  In equilibrium expectations are met.  The Bayesian inference in this solution 
concept requires us to state how a consumer’s beliefs are updated when he comes across 
a price other than p at a particular store.  For this I assume that he will continue to 
anticipate a price p for products yet to be searched. 
Note that the firm’s pay-off (via expected demand) is affected by the extent of 
consumer search; also, the extent of consumer search is affected by the amount of 
advertising.  It is the interaction between information dissemination and information 
acquisition that I contend is present in all markets of imperfect information. 
  
3.1.3. Firms 
I assume there are n single product firms producing horizontally differentiated 
products.  Firms are otherwise identical.  I normalize production costs to zero and 
assume that each firm’s advertising technology is represented by );( λφA  with 
0,0,0,0 >>>> λφλφφφ AAAA  and 0);0( =Α λ .  The function A indicates the cost 
incurred by a firm to advertise its brand to a proportion ]1,0[∈φ  of the consumer 
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population.  The parameter λ shifts the advertising cost curve and is thus a measure of 
the efficiency of the advertising technology.   
 
3.1.4. Consumers 
I assume the number of consumers in this model is normalized to one.  I also 
assume consumers have heterogeneous preferences with a perfectly inelastic unit 
individual demand for the product.  The distribution of match values is independently 
and identically distributed (iid) and represented by twice differentiable and continuous 
distribution F.  These match values are distributed over the interval ],[ ba∈ε .  The 
identical assumption means the distribution of match values is the same for each brand 
and the independence assumption means that the consumer can not use a match value 
realized for one brand to predict the match value he will realize for another brand.  
Consumers are aware of the existence of the product but have no a priori 
information about their match value for the various n brands.  Conditional on consuming 
brand },,2,1{ nk K∈ , the indirect utility enjoyed is given by 
 
(3.1)   ,)( kkki pypv ε+−=        
 
where kε is the match value for brand k , kp is the price, and y is income.  A consumer 
incurs a search cost c whenever he visits a store for the first time.  The net utility 
received by participating in this market is therefore given as zcpvi .)( − where z is the 
number of stores visited by the consumer.  I now discuss the consumer’s optimal search 
strategy. 
 
 3.1.5. Consumer Search Behavior 
Consumers know the number of firms in the market but are unaware of the extent 
to which they would like a particular brand.  One way in which a consumer may become 
aware of their match for a brand is through an advertisement received from that firm; 
otherwise, he becomes aware of how much he likes the brand by searching (buying 
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information about the brand).  I assume a sequential search behavior pattern with 
consumers having perfect recall.  Perfect recall means a consumer never forgets his 
match value for a brand already searched.  Further, I assume once the consumer incurs 
the cost of searching a particular store, he may return at no additional cost.  However, if 
the consumer is informed about a product through advertisement, he must pay the search 
cost if he chooses to visit the store.  In this search pattern, each consumer visits at least 
one firm.  Consumers rationally anticipate that each unsampled firm charges the same 
price. 
The gain from engaging in these costly visits is finding the brand with a higher 
match value.  Based on the distribution of match values, consumers have a reservation 
value for the product.  This reservation value represents the minimum match value a 
consumer could realize in order to make the cost of another search outweigh the 
expected gain of an additional search.  This implies a consumer will stop searching (and 
buy from that firm) if he realizes a match value at least as great as his reservation value. 
 
3.1.5.1. Search without Prior Information 
The reservation value for a given consumer is intimately linked to the 
information available to him prior to search.  I now consider uninformed consumers: 
those without information on any brand.  I assume the distribution of match values, F is 
such that the expected surplus from the very first visit exceeds the cost of search.  This 
means that an uninformed consumer is willing to pay the search cost c  and visit a 
randomly selected store.  Without loss of generality, I label the surplus gained at this 
store as )( 11 p−ε . 
How high would this surplus need to be to deter the consumer from paying an 
additional search cost in order to sample an additional store?  If another store is sampled 
and the consumer gets a surplus of )( p−ε , the consumer only benefits if 
)()( 11 pp −>− εε .  The marginal benefit of visiting a second store as opposed to buying 
from the first store is therefore )}({ 11 pp +−− εε  if )( 11 pp +−> εε  and 0  if 
)( 11 pp +−≤ εε .  Since )( 11 p−ε is known and p is rationally anticipated, ε is the only 
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random variable.  The expected benefit from searching an additional store is therefore 
given as }]0),([max{ 11 ppE +−− εεε .  Define xˆ  as the match value from store 1 (net of 
price differential) that equates the marginal benefit of search with the marginal cost of 
search. 
 
(3.2)   cxE =− }]0),ˆ[max{(εε  
 
Proposition 1. The reservation value match ℜ∈xˆ is a decreasing, convex function of 
search costs. 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Rewrite equation (3.2) as ∫ =−−
b
x
cdFx
ˆ
0)()ˆ( εε .  Totally 
differentiating the Left Hand Side with respect to xˆ and c  gives 0ˆ))ˆ(1( =−−− dcxdxF .  
This implies 0
))ˆ(1(
1ˆ <−−= xFdc
xd and 0
))ˆ(1(
)ˆ(ˆˆ
22
2
>−−= xF
xf
dc
xd
dc
xd .     Q.E.D. 
It is obvious that the left hand side of equation (3.2) decreases in xˆ .  This implies 
that for )ˆ( 11 xpp >+−ε , the expected marginal benefit of searching the second store is 
less than the cost of search.  For uninformed consumers, therefore, the reservation match 
value is given as )ˆ( 1 ppx −+ ; for ppx −+> 11 ˆε  searching an additional store is not 
expected be worth the cost whereas for ppx −+< 11 ˆε  the search will be worthwhile.  
The optimal sequential search strategy for a consumer without prior information is 
therefore: 
 
Lemma 1. Search Strategy I (Uninformed Consumers) 
i. Randomly select the first store to search. 
ii. Stop searching (buy from the store) if the realized match value 
exceeds )ˆ( 1 ppx −+ ; otherwise randomly select another store and 
continue to search until the condition is met. 
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iii. If the stop rule in step ii is not met and all stores have been searched, then 
return to the store that offers the highest surplus. 
3.1.5.2. Search with Prior Information 
I now outline an optimal search strategy for partially informed consumers: those 
with prior information about at least one brand but not every brand.  Without loss of 
generality, label as brand 1, the brand that offers the highest surplus among those the 
consumer is informed about.  The surplus from buying brand 1 is therefore 
)( 11 cp −−ε since the consumer must still incur the search cost even though he is 
informed about the brand’s characteristics prior to search; this highlights the primary 
difference between information acquired prior to search and information gathered during 
search.  Since the consumer obtains information without visiting the store, the effective 
price must be considered as )( cp + instead of p for consumers who gather the 
information during search. 
A consumer with prior information (via advertising) may decide to visit an 
unadvertised store k  where he realizes a surplus )( pk −ε .  The partially informed 
consumer’s decision of whether to accept the advertised offer from firm 1 or search the 
other stores hinge critically on his expected benefits from searching.  Recall the 
discussion in the previous section that if his best offer exceeds )ˆ( 1 ppx −+ , with 
xˆ defined in equation (3.2) above, then the consumer is not expected to benefit from 
search and will consequently go directly to buy an advertised brand.  A consumer will 
buy immediately from the set of advertised brands if ])(ˆ[ 11 pcpx −++>ε .  Once the 
consumer decides against buying an advertised product immediately, his reservation 
value for each unadvertised brand is identical to that of uninformed consumers, 
)ˆ( ppx k −+ .  The optimal sequential search strategy for a consumer with prior 
information is therefore: 
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Lemma 2. Search Strategy II (Partially Informed Consumers) 
i. Consider the product that offers the highest surplus from among the 
advertised brands. Label this brand 1. 
ii. Buy brand 1 if the surplus exceeds )ˆ( 1 cppx +−+ ; otherwise randomly 
select a store to visit. 
iii. Stop searching (buy from the store k ) if the realized match value 
exceeds )ˆ( ppx k −+ ; otherwise randomly select another store and continue 
to search until the condition is met. 
iv. If the stop rule in step (iii) is not met and all stores have been searched, then 
return to the brand (advertised or not) that offers the highest surplus. 
A key distinction between the strategy of the uniformed and partially informed 
consumers is the determination of which store is given first consideration.  For 
uninformed consumers, the store that is given first consideration is determined randomly 
while for partially informed consumers, first consideration is given to stores the 
consumer has prior information on.  This suggests each firm has an incentive to ensure 
that consumers have prior information about its product and immediately suggest a role 
for informative advertising prior to consumer search. 
 
3.2. Demand Estimation when Consumers Search 
I now outline the expected demand faced by a representative firm, say firm 1, 
based on its beliefs about rivals’ price strategies and consumers’ search strategies.  Here 
I consider only symmetric equilibrium strategies where firm 1 believes each rival 
charges price p and consumers anticipate this price at all stores yet to be search.  Firms 
1’s expected demand then shows how firm 1 anticipates how demand for his brand to 
change if he charges ),0[1 ∞∈p , given that rivals charge p  and consumers expect each 
firms to charge p .  The chance a given consumer purchases firm 1’s brand depends on 
the number of brands the consumer is informed about prior to search.  I therefore derive 
the expected demand for consumers based on the number of products consumers are 
informed about.  Consumers will be segmented into three groups based on the amount of 
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brands they are informed about prior to search; fully informed consumers, uninformed 
consumers and partially informed consumers. 
 
3.2.1. Fully Informed Consumers 
It is assumed in this section that consumers have prior information on all brands 
available in the market.  These consumers go directly to the brand offering the highest 
surplus.  Consider a consumer who receives a match value of 1ε for brand 1.  The 
consumer will visit (and buy) from firm 1 if the surplus is lower at all other stores.  The 
chance this occurs is given as ],,Pr[ 11112 pppp n −<−−<− εεεε L .  Since the 
distribution match values is iid across brands,  
 
∏
=
+−=−<−−<−
n
j
n ppFpppp j
2
1111112 )(],,Pr[ εεεεε εL  (by independence) 
          )( 11
1 ppF n +−= − ε  (by identical) 
where we use the notation 11 )]([)( −− ⋅≡⋅ nn FF  
The expected demand for firm 1’s product from fully informed consumers is then 
found by aggregating over match values.  That is, 
  
(3.3)   ∫ +−⋅= −
b
a
n
n
f dFppFLppD )()(),( 1
1
1 εε     
where nL is the number of fully informed consumers. 
 
3.2.2. Uninformed Consumers 
In this Section, I derive the expected demand for brand 1 from consumers who 
have no prior information on any brand; this is first developed in Wolinsky (1986) and 
based on the consumer behavior outlined in Lemma 1.  The order in which the stores are 
searched is randomly determined; subsequently, each store has an equal chance of being 
the ths  ( ns ,,1L= ) store visited by a consumer.  Since a consumer continues to search 
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only if he does not realize his reservation value, the probability firm 1 is searched on the 
ths visit by the consumer is )ˆ(1 1 xF
n
s− because it must be the case that the consumer 
realize a match value below his reservation level on visits to the previous )1( −s stores.  
The probability that the consumer buys brand 1 on his ths  overall trip is 
therefore ))ˆ(1)(ˆ(1 1
1 ppxFxF
n
s −+−− . 
The demand from consumers who stops and buys at firm 1 (step (ii) in Lemma 1) 
is given by ∑ −+−
=
−n
s
s ppxFxF
n 1 1
1 ))ˆ(1)(ˆ(1 .  Consumers who receive a match value at 
firm 1 lower than the reservation value might still return to purchase brand 1 if the match 
value at all other stores is even lower than that received at firm 1.  These are consumers 
who reach step (iii) in Lemma 1.  Since these consumers have searched all the stores, 
their expected demand for firm 1 is similar to the expected demand from fully informed 
consumers.  That is, the probability that such a consumer who receives a match value of 
)ˆ( 11 ppx −+<ε at store 1 buys brand 1 is given as ∫ +−
−+ −ppx
a
n dFppF
1ˆ
111
1 )()( εε .   
 
Proposition 2. The expected demand from uninformed consumers for firm 1’s product is 
given as 
(3.4) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∫ +−+−
−−+−= −+ −ppx
a
n
n
u dFppF
xF
xFppxF
n
LcppD
1ˆ
1
1
1011 )()()]ˆ(1[
)]ˆ(1[))ˆ(1(1);,( εε   
where 0L is the number of uninformed consumers. 
 
3.2.3. Partially Informed Consumers 
In this section, I derive the expected demand for firm 1 from consumers who 
have prior information on exactly r  ( 1,,1 −= nr L ) brands.  These consumers follow 
the search strategy outlined in Lemma 2.  There is a measure rL of consumers who have 
prior information about r products.  The demand for brand 1 from partially informed 
   23
consumers depends on how many of these consumers have prior information about 
brand 1.  Let us use a )(+  superscript to denote the number of consumers who have prior 
information about brand 1 and a )(−  superscript to denote the measure of consumers 
without prior information about brand 1.  By definition, therefore, −+ += rrr LLL .  
Similarly, let rM be the set of brands that are successfully advertised to a given 
consumer with +rM (respectively, 
−
rM ) indicating that brand 1 is included (respectively, 
excluded) from this set. 
 
Proposition 3. The expected demand for brand 1 is given as  
(3.5)  [ ]∑ += −
=
−−++1
1
11 );,(
n
r
rrrr
p DLDLcppD  
with 
(3.6) ∫∫
+−+
−−
+−+
−+ −+−⋅+−++−≡
cppx
a
rnr
b
cppx
r
r dFcppFppFdFppFD
1
1
ˆ
11
1
ˆ
1
1 )()()()()( εεεεε  
(3.7) )()]()(1[)(
ˆ
1
11 εεεε dFcppFcFF
rn
rD
cx
a
rnr
r ∫ −−+−−⋅−≡
+ −−−−  
 
Proof of Proposition 3. The term +rD  represents the demand for brand 1 from a 
consumer with prior information about brand 1 and )1( −r other brands in the market, 
1,,1 −= nr L .  These r firms are in direct competition with each other and only the firm 
that offers the highest surplus to a given consumer has a chance of being selected by the 
consumer.  Let us label the advertised brands from 1 to r , that is },,1{ rM r K=+ .  The 
probability firm 1 is the consumer’s best offer is given by 
 
 )()](maxPr[ 11
1
,111
ppFpp rjMjj r +−=−>− −∈≠ + εεε  
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The first term in +rD captures the idea consumers buy brand 1 directly whenever 
their match value is in excess of the reservation value )ˆ( 11 cppx +−+>ε ; this is in 
keeping with step (i) of Lemma 2.  Consumers whose best offer is below the reservation 
value )ˆ( 11 cppx +−+≤ε  search the other )( rn −  stores before consider buying the 
best advertised brand.  During search, they realize a match value +∉∈ rs Msba ),,(ε  at 
an anticipated price p .  These consumers return to buy brand 1 only if the surplus from 
brand 1 exceeds the highest surplus realized at the other stores. The probability a 
consumer finds a lower match value at the other )( rn − stores is given as 
 
 )()](maxPr[ 1111 cpFpcp
rn
sMs r
−−≡−>−− −∉ + εεε  
 
The second term therefore represents the number of consumers who finds brand 
1 better than the other advertised brands as well as better than the unadvertised brands. 
The expected measure of consumers that buys brand 1 is found by taking expectations 
over cppx +−+< 11 ˆε . 
 The term −rD  represents the demand from consumers without prior information 
about brand 1.  Label the set of advertised brands as },,1{ nrnM r K+−=− .  Note that 
brand 1 is not advertised to these consumers ( −∉ rM1 ).  Recall that firm 1 believes each 
rival charges identical price p .  Firm 1 then believes that with probability )(1 ε−rF , a 
consumer with a match value ε  will search at least one of the other ( rn − ) stores.  The 
total amount of consumers who do not receive an advertisement from firm 1 but decides 
to search is given by )(1 ε−⋅ rFr .  Further, the probability that each of these consumers 
find a greater surplus for an unadvertised brand (which includes firm 1) is given by 
)]()(1[ 1
1 cppFcF rn −−+−− −− εε .  Since each of these )( rn −  has an equal chance of 
being sampled during search, the probability that firm 1 is selected is 
)]()(1)[( 1
11 cppFcFF
rn
r rnr −−+−−⋅−
−−− εεε  and the expected demand from these 
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partially informed consumers is then found by aggregating over possible values 
]ˆ,[ cxak +∈ε .     Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 1.  The expected demand facing each firm when consumers with heterogeneous 
prior information engage in sequential search strategies is given as 
(3.8) 
[ ] );,();,();,(),();,( 1101
1
111111 cppDLcppDLcppDLppDLcppD
un
r
rrrr
f
n +∑ ++=
−
=
−−++     
with 1
0
=∑
=
n
s
sL  
The demand in equation (3.8) above is a generalization of the demand generated 
by those commonly used models in the extant literature.  For instance, when 10 =L  the 
model specifies to Wolinsky (1986) whereas for 1=nL , the model specifies the demand 
generated under markets with complete information. 
 
3.3. Existence and Uniqueness of Price Equilibrium 
A sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price 
strategy is for the Demand curve [equation (3.8)] to be concave in 1p .  To establish 
uniqueness, therefore, I appeal to aggregation results in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). 
The demand function for the fully informed (Section 3.2.1) and uninformed 
consumers (Section 3.2) have already been shown to be concave in the Literature.  I now 
proceed to establish concavity of the demand for partially informed consumers (Section 
3.2).  In Appendix B, I show that demand from partially informed consumer can be 
written 
 
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ∫−+∫ ∫+= Ε∈−Ε∈ Ε∈+ 31 2 )()()();,( 11 εε ε εεεεεε dgrn rLdgdgLcppD rrr   
with },,{ 1 nεεε K= , njbaj ,,1],,[ K=∈ε , ∏= =
n
j
jfg
1
)()( εε . 
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} ˆ and  )(max:{ 11,1111 cpxppp jMjj r +−>−−>−=Ε +∈≠ εεεε , 
and ˆ and  )(max:{ 11,1112 cpxppp jMjj r +−<−−>−=Ε +∈≠ εεεε              
)}(max11 pcp sMs r −>−− +∉ εε , 
 and  ˆ and )(max  :{
,3
cpxppp kjMjkjk r +−<−−>−=Ε −∈≠ εεεε
 }},{max 11,1 ppcp sMssk r −−<−− −∉≠ εεε  
Caplin and Nalebuff show that as long as preferences are linear in ε , then the 
integration of g over any convex subset of its domain induces certain properties on the 
shape of the integral.  Specifically, if ρg is concave, then 
ρ
ρ
n
Xx
dxxg
+
∈ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∫ 1)( is also 
concave. 
They show that integrating over a log-concave distribution will result in a 
concave function.  As long as f is log-concave, g is log-concave since it is the product 
of log-cave functions.  The expected demand is a linear combination of integrals of joint 
cumulative distribution of match values.  Using the result by Caplin and Nalebuff, these 
integrals will result in a concave function as long as the distribution of match values f is 
log concave. The family of log concave distributions includes the Uniform, Normal, 
Beta, exponential and many others commonly used as statistical distributions.  
 The aggregate demand for brand 1 is therefore concave since it is a linear 
combination of concave functions. 
 
3.3.1. Symmetric Equilibrium 
In this section, I determine the symmetric equilibrium pricing strategies of firms. 
I assume fixed costs of production are zero and firms produce at a constant marginal cost 
that we normalize to zero.  Assuming zero marginal cost of production means that the 
equilibrium price strategies derived should be interpreted as the price-cost margin as 
opposed to nominal price levels.  The expected profit of firm 1 given its beliefs that rival 
firms charge p and consumers follow a sequential search strategy is given by 
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(3.9)   );,();,( 11111 cppDpcpp =π       
 
The FOC for profit maximization for firm 1 is given as 
 
(3.10)   0);,(
1
11 =∂
∂+
p
DpcppD      
  
Imposing symmetry in equilibrium strategies ( pp =1 ) gives    
 
(3.11)   
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1
1
cppn
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D
∂
∂−=       
  
The discussion in the previous section guarantees the uniqueness of the pricing 
strategy outlined in equation (3.11) so long as the distribution of match values f is log-
concave.  Without loss of generality, therefore, I make the following assumption for 
computational ease. 
 
Assumption 1.  Consumer match values are uniformly distributed over the unit interval. 
It is straightforward to show that firm 1’s expected demand is decreasing in own 
price and (under assumption 1) is given as 
 
Proposition 4. 
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 0<   
Proof of Proposition 4. (See Appendix A) 
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Assumption 2.  (i) +− −= rr Lr
rnL and (ii)
r
nLL rr
+=  
Under assumption 2, I can show 
 
Proposition 5. 
(3.13) 
n
ppD 1),(1 =           
   
Proof of Proposition 5.
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   29
3.3.2. Limiting Equilibrium 
Since primary interest is in long run equilibrium of monopolistically competitive 
markets, I now derive the equilibrium pricing strategy for firms as the number of firm in 
the industry becomes arbitrarily large ( ∞→n ).  By taking the limits of equation (3.12) 
and substituting in equation (3.11), the unique equilibrium price strategy in this large 
group market where consumers are heterogeneous along preference and prior 
information set is given as 
 
(3.14)  
1
1
1
0 )(lim
))(ˆ(1
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−−
=
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This means equilibrium profits in the market is given as 
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The search model proposed in Wolinsky (1986) is a special case of my model 
whereby every consumer is uninformed.  This is evident by substituting 
1,,1,0,10 −==== + nrLLL nr L  (no consumer has prior information) into the equations 
above and comparing them to the relevant expressions in equations (19) and (20) in 
Wolinsky (1986).  In order for this pricing strategy to represent a truly monopolistic 
competitive market, the limit equilibrium price must be above the marginal cost of 
production (that is, 0>p ).  This condition will only be met if )(lim 1
1
∑+ −
=
+
∞→
n
r
rnn
LLn  is finite.  
This condition is met in Wolinsky (1986) by assuming 0)(
1
1
=∑+ −
=
+n
r
rn LL .  I need not make 
such a strong assumption here.  All that is required is for the expression )(
1
1
∑+ −
=
+n
r
rn LL  to 
approach zero at a rate at least as fast as 
n
1 ; otherwise price equals marginal cost in the 
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limit.  Since )(
1
1
∑+ −
=
+n
r
rn LL represents the number of consumers informed about a given 
product, the intuitive interpretation of this condition is: for firms to maintain market 
power in the limit equilibrium, is it is sufficient that very few consumers have prior 
information about a given product.  The equilibrium has the desirable property of price 
uniformly approaching competitive level whenever cost of information acquisition 
approaches zero, that is ( ) 0limlim
0
=∞→→ pnc . 
The main point of Wolinsky is to point out firms maintain market power ( 0>p ) 
in large markets if consumers are imperfectly informed and acquiring the information is 
costly.  But the sensitivity of the properties of the equilibrium pricing strategy to the 
number of consumers informed about a given product consumers suggests Wolinsky 
omitted a least one essential component of true monopolistically competitive market 
structures.  I argue that such a missing component is the market determined distribution 
of information prior to search. 
 In order to endogenize the distribution of information prior to search, I must first 
specify a means of information transmission.  This is presented in the next section which 
describes a model of informative advertising. 
 
3.4. Advertising and Consumer Search 
The analysis above describes a search model in which consumers have 
heterogeneous prior information.  A limitation of previous models in the Industrial 
Organization literature is the lack of attention paid to consumers with heterogeneous 
prior information sets.  An exception is Anderson and Renault (2000) who consider a 
search model with fully informed and uninformed consumers (that is 
1,,1,0 −== nrLr K ).  As far as one the major objective of this paper is concerned, the 
obvious short-coming of their model is that it does not facilitate analysis of consumers 
with information about a subset of the brands available in the market (partially informed 
consumers).  In this chapter, I capture a market with imperfect information in which 
there is active information acquisition and information dissemination on the part of 
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economic agents.  It is very unlikely any information-disseminating technology used by 
non-colluding firms would lead to such discrete prior information sets for consumers as 
in Anderson and Renault (2000).  The model outlined in Section 3.2 is sufficient to 
capture more continuous levels of heterogeneity in consumer’s prior information.  In the 
next section, I complete the model by specifying how the heterogeneity in consumer 
information is endogenously generated through informative advertising. 
 
3.4.1. Advertising Technology 
In what follows, I describe a model informative advertising.  Firm },,1{ nk K∈  
randomly disseminates information about its brand (i.e., advertise) to a measure 
]1,0[∈kφ  of consumers.  The advertising cost is an increasing convex function ofφ , the 
advertising reach.  Denote this function as ),( λφA with 0,0,0);0( >>= φφφλ AAA , 
0>λ .  
Assume advertising technology is identical across firms and the decision about 
how many consumers to inform is set independently by each firm and no firm has the 
ability to target any specific segment of the consumer population.  Since I am primarily 
concerned with the symmetric equilibrium, denote nkk ,,2, L==φφ and focus on firm 
1’s optimal advertising strategy given its belief that rivals selectφ .  These assumptions 
allow me to capture heterogeneity of consumer prior information by quantifying the 
expected number of messages received by consumers. 
 
Proposition 6. (i) rnrr r
n
L −−+ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−= )1(
1
1 1
1 φφφ , (ii) )1()1(1 11 φφφ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= −−− rnrr r
n
L  
(iii) )1()1( 1
1
0 φφ −−= −nL , (iv) 11φφ −= nnL  
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Statistical principles tells us that if you have n firms trying to 
send information to consumers, the total number of different combination in which a 
consumer successfully receives an advertisement from }1,,1{ −∈ nr L firms (and fails to 
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receive an ad from )( rn −  firms) is given by 
!)!(
!
rrn
n
r
n
−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ .  Further, the number of 
ways that an advertisement from firm 1 is one of those r advertisements successfully 
transmitted to the consumer is given as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
1
1
r
n
.  This implies that the number of 
consumers who receive an advertisement from firm 1 and )1( −r other firms is given as 
rnr
r r
n
L −−+ −⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−≡ )1(
1
1 1
1 φφφ .  (ii)  Similarly, the number of ways the message firm 1 is 
not successfully transmitted is given as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
r
n 1
 which implies that number of consumers 
who receive an advertisement from r firms but none from firm 1 is given as 
)1()1(
1
1
1 φφφ −−⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≡ −−− rnrr r
n
L .  (iii)  Similarly, there is only one way in which no 
consumer receives any advertisement from any firm, )1()1( 1
1
0 φφ −−≡ −nL  and (iv) only 
one way in which each consumer receives an advertisement from every firm, 
1
1
−≡ nnL φφ .     Q.E.D.  
It is easy to verify that assumption 2 is also satisfied for this advertising 
technology. 
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Proof of Lemma 3:  By Proposition 6,   
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The demand for brand 1 is obtained by substituting the expressions for 
nrLr ,,1,0, K=  in Theorem 1.  That is 
 
(3.16) 
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where fD1 is given in equation (3.3), 
+
rD , 
−
rD  and 
uD1 are given in equations (3.6), (3.7) 
and (3.4) respectively. 
 
3.4.2. Symmetric Equilibrium 
In this section, I derive the symmetric equilibrium strategies in price and 
advertising strategies. 
 
Definition 1.  Market equilibrium is a pair },{ φp such that 
);();,,,(),;,,,(maxarg},{ 1111111},{ λφφφλφφπφ φ AcppDpcppp p −=∈  
The FOCs for this problem is given as 
 
(3.17)  0),;,(),;,(
1
=−∂
∂ φφφφ ppDpp
p
Dp     )0( =pπ  
(3.18)  0);(),;,(
1
=−∂
∂ λφφφφ φApp
Dp     )0( =φπ  
    
3.4.3. Limit Equilibrium 
In this section, I analyze equilibrium in this advertising model when the number 
of firms is large.  Specifically we look at the limiting case as the number of firms gets 
infinitely large.  
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Proposition 7. 
   (i) { } { })1(1
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Proof of Proposition 7. (See Appendix A) 
 
Proposition 7 implies that for the large group market with differentiated products, 
equilibrium is characterized by 
 
(3.19)                     φnp
1=        
(3.20)     ( ) 1);(2 =∂
∂ λφφφ
An    
     
The equilibrium price strategy in equation (3.19) is equivalent in form to the 
equilibrium price in equation (3.14) after substituting the endogenously determine 
distribution of prior information. To see this, note that in the advertising equilibrium, 
 
0)1(lim 0 =−≡∞→
n
n
L φ and 0lim =≡∞→ nnn L φ   
 Equation (3.19) is then recovered by substituting these terms into equation 
(3.14). The pricing strategy in (3.19) is not surprising.  Under perfect information with 
n′ firms competing, the equilibrium price is given as 
n′
1 .  (To see this substitute 1=φ in 
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equation (3.19) to derive the full information result).  As I discuss in detail in the 
following section, the effective number of firms competing for each consumer is 
φnn =′ , hence the equilibrium price should in fact be φn
1 .   
 
Theorem 2. As ∞→n  
(i.)  The number of consumers informed about a given product is 0→φ  
(ii.)  The equilibrium price strategy is );0( λφAp →  
(iii.) The average number of products consumers are informed about is 
[ ] 21);0( −→ λφ φAn  
Proof of Theorem 2: (i) To demonstrate that φn  increase as n increases, we use the 
deduction put forth in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) by examining the equilibrium 
condition in equation (3.20).  As n increases, φ must decline to keep the equation 
balance.  But if φ falls, so must φA since 0>φφA .  Further, if φA falls, φn must increase 
to keep the equation balanced. (ii)  From equation (3.20), [ ] 21−= φφ An .  Substitute this 
into equation 3.19 to complete proof. (iii)  This result is immediate from (ii) above. 
Q.E.D. 
An interesting property of this equilibrium is
( )
0
lim =∂
∂ ∞→
c
p
n ; in the limit as the 
market expands, the pricing strategy of firms is not affected by the search cost. All that 
is required to sustain this equilibrium is for 0>c .  This does not mean, however, that 
there is no actual search in equilibrium.  Consumers actively search in equilibrium as 
long as the advertising technology is not too efficient.  Firms are not influenced by the 
search cost but not because consumers do not search; rather, it is because no individual 
firm expects to generate sales from consumers who search. 
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3.5. Discussion 
My model of advertising is a hybrid of advertising models of Grossman and 
Shapiro (1984) with differentiated products but no search technology and Robert and 
Stahl (1993) with consumer search but homogenous products.  Accordingly, my model 
nests these models as special cases.  In what follows, I compare these models and 
highlight the additional insights gleamed by modeling both channels of information 
transmission in differentiated products markets. 
The market equilibrium strategies given in Theorem 2 are striking since they are 
identical to the equilibrium strategies in Grossman and Shapiro (1984).  It must then be 
the case that either consumers do not search in equilibrium in my model or firms are not 
influenced by consumers who search; I show that the latter is indeed correct.  The fact 
strategies are identical is a consequence of the large group assumption.  In a large 
market, no individual firm expects to generate revenues from consumers who search 
since the probability that any individual firm is randomly selected approaches zero 
whenever the market is large.  This means that firms expect to generate sales revenue 
exclusively from consumers who observe their advertisements and this is observationally 
equivalent to the model developed in Grossman and Shapiro.  The key distinction is that 
in my model consumers may or may not search; the extent of consumer search varies in 
my model and is endogenously determined by the advertising and consumer search 
technologies.  In Grossman and Shapiro a lack of consumer search is exogenously 
imposed. 
 Robert and Stahl (1993) highlight the asymmetric effects of the advertising and 
search information channels on market equilibrium.  They show that the advertising 
technology is solely responsible for determining whether or not firms maintain market 
power in equilibrium.  I also observe this asymmetric effect in my paper and show that 
advertising has more far reaching effects on the equilibrium.  In what follows, I show the 
dominant role of the advertising technology extends to other features of equilibrium. 
Another feature of equilibrium in Robert and Stahl (1993) is that each consumer 
is informed about almost all the brands available in the market. A consequence of this 
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result, therefore, is that there is no real search in equilibrium.  In my model, a consumer 
need not be informed about that many products in equilibrium and search occurs when 
the advertising technology is sufficiently inefficient. The advertising and search 
technologies jointly determine the extent of consumer search in equilibrium; however 
advertising plays a greater role.  For the advertising technology described in the previous 
section, the number of advertisements that are successfully transmitted to consumers in 
equilibrium follows a binomial random variable with n  independent trials, each with 
φ probability of success.  Therefore an average of φn  advertisements is successfully 
transmitted to each consumer.  A consumer searches only if no advertised brand meets 
his reservation value.  The probability that a consumer searches in equilibrium is 
therefore )ˆ( cxF n +φ .  This term captures the idea that consumer search in equilibrium is 
jointly determined by advertising technology (via φn ) and search technology (via 
cx +ˆ ).  Whenever the advertising technology is relatively efficient ( ),0( λφA is small) so 
that ∞→φn  (by Theorem 2), each consumer is informed about a large number of 
brands and so search is unlikely in equilibrium, regardless of the search technology.  
Whenever the advertising technology is relatively inefficient ( ),0( λφA is large), each 
consumer is informed about a few products and is therefore expected to search at least 
one product.  In this case the extent of search (number of brands searched) is determined 
by the search technology. 
Theorem 2 shows that extent of market power maintain in equilibrium depend on 
the value of ),0( λφA ; price exceeds marginal cost whenever 0),0( >λφA .  What is clear 
from the result, however, is that market power in large markets does not necessarily 
imply advertising is not fully informative in nature. 
  
3.6. Conclusion 
Economists often encounter situations in which agents with asymmetric 
information interact in a non-cooperative manner.  In such cases, there is an incentive for 
the agent in the disadvantaged position to take active steps to acquire the information as 
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well as incentives for agents to make this information available to the disadvantaged.  I 
argue explicitly modeling both channels of information flow is crucial for a more 
complete understanding of these markets.  Although the arguments are advanced within 
the confines of a differentiated product market, the implications are relevant to a much 
broader spectrum of economic analysis. 
The main result of this chapter reconciles the modern view of advertising with 
the theory of monopolistic competition. I show advertising can be a pro-competitive tool 
that increases the substitutability among products while allowing firms maintain market 
power in the limit as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large.  This is an important 
contribution to the debate on the role of advertising.  Monopolistic competition has long 
since been held up to delineate the persuasive or combative purpose of advertising which 
allow firms to manipulate consumer preferences in favor of the advertised product in 
order to maintain market power. I have shown under informative advertising, firms 
maintain market power in the limit if the initial effort to disseminate information is 
costly whereas firms will lose all market power if this initial effort is costless. Hopefully, 
this chapter has now moved the discussion of the source of market power in 
monopolistically competitive markets from the role of advertising (informative vs. 
persuasive) to the nature of the advertising technology. 
Chapter III has also highlighted the dominant role played by advertising 
technology in achieving the (resource allocative) efficient market outcome.  When the 
initial costs to send an advertisement to an additional consumer is zero, equilibrium price 
in large markets approaches marginal cost.  This result is not new, as it was also present 
in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Robert and Stahl (1993).  The value of this finding 
lies in the fact that it is now shown to be robust to diverse modeling assumptions as it is 
shown to be invariant to consumer search and heterogeneity in product characteristics. 
An underlying assumption of search models is consumers have limited 
information about the product (its existence) that allows them to search brands that are 
not advertised to them; the source of this information was left unspecified.  Knowledge 
of the existence of the product is invaluable information to consumers who would prefer 
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consuming any brand to not consuming any at all.  This is especially true in 
circumstances where it is too expensive for consumers to acquire this information on 
their own. 
This observation suggests a natural extension of the study presented in this 
chapter.  It would be fruitful to devise a model that allows a firm to choose the amount 
of brand-specific information contained in its advertisements.  The immediate issue 
would be to determine the circumstances in which firms prefer to disclose more 
information to less information in their advertisements. 
To the best of my knowledge, the only study to explicitly model advertising 
content in the economic literature is Anderson and Renault (2004) who explores the 
issue in a monopoly market structure.  Given the amount of resources spent by firms to 
advertise their products in oligopoly markets, the relationship between advertising 
content and the performance of these markets is of both theoretical and practical 
concern.  These and other issues are developed further and explored in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INFORMATION CONTENT AND DISCOVERY COST 
Is there any merit to the claim that the use of uninformative advertisements 
provides substantial evidence in support of the view that advertising has an anti-
competitive effect on the performance of the market?  I argue that the information 
content of the advertisement in and of itself can not be used to assess the effect of 
advertising on the performance of the market.  In this chapter, a model of advertising 
that is most favorable to the anti-competitive view is presented: advertising with no 
brand-specific information.  I do not dispute that there might be instances when 
advertising is uninformative.  My point is that it is ill-advised to evaluate the 
informativeness of an advertisement regime based solely on its observable information 
content; cost of information acquisition must also be considered. 
Information acquisition cost is at the heart of this analysis.  I am not referring to 
search cost that was discussed in Chapter III.  In this chapter, I discuss discovery cost.  
Discovery cost refers to the amount of resources expended by an individual to learn 
about the existence of a product.  This is to be distinguished from the analysis of search 
costs in Chapter III which assumes each consumer is already aware of the existence of 
product but gathers information on particular brands of the product.  When the discovery 
cost associated with a given product is prohibitively high, therefore, consumers will not 
participate in the market for that product unless information is disseminated to these 
consumers about the existence of the product.  I argue in this chapter that advertisements 
without any brand specific information informs consumers that the product exists 
whenever discovery cost is high; it is in this sense I show that information content of an 
advertisement is an inadequate measure of its informativeness.  
In Section 4.2, I derive alternative models of advertising based on information 
content and derive the equilibrium price, advertising intensities and expected economic 
rents under each regime within a broad class of consumer preference distribution.  I 
specialize the models to the uniform distribution case and compare the profits under each 
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regime. I also carry out comparative static results and consider how various endogenous 
variables are affected by the parameters in the model.  In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, I calibrate 
the parameters in my model with empirical data and discuss the implications of 
calibrated results.  I conclude my study in Section 4.6 where I suggest areas of future 
investigations. 
 
4.1. Duopoly Model 
I consider a duopoly market with each firm producing a single brand.  Brands are 
differentiated but consumers do not perceive any differences in quality of the brands.  
Consumers have a unit demand for the product.  Firms compete in price, advertising 
level and advertising content.  Each firm maximizes expected profits calculated as total 
expected revenue less advertising expenditures since production costs are normalized to 
zero.  The number of consumers is normalized to 1.  Consumers are unaware of how 
well either product is matched to their taste but they know match values for each product 
is identically and independently distributed by a log concave distribution F on the 
interval ],[ ba .  Consumers must first decide whether to participate in the market and 
then decide which brand to select, conditional on deciding to participate.  Consumers 
will only participate in the market if either discovery cost is low or an advertisement is 
received from at least one firm. 
 
4.1.1. Description of the Game 
There are four stages }3,2,1,0{ and three sets of players: two firms, a continuum 
of consumers and Nature.  The timing of the game is as follows.  At Stage 0, Nature 
assigns each consumer with a match value for each brand.  The other players do not 
observe the individual assignments but each player knows the distribution F  from 
which the match values are drawn. At Stage 1, each firm decides on how much 
information },{ UI  to disclose in advertisements in order to maximize expected profits.  
An advertising regime is said to be Informative ( I ) if a consumer’s assigned match 
value and the price of the brand are revealed through the advertisement.  A regime is 
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said to be Uninformative (U ) if neither the price nor match value are revealed by the 
advertisement. 
In Stage 2 the advertising regime of both firms is common knowledge.  Further, 
each firm decides the price ),0[ ∞∈p  and advertising level ]1,0[∈φ .  The amount of 
information contained in each advertisement depends on the decision taken by firms at 
Stage 1. 
In Stage 3, consumers select a brand to purchase.  A consumer who receives an 
advertisement selects a brand based on the information contained in the advertisement as 
well as information acquired in subsequent searches.  A consumer who does not receive 
an advertisement will not participate in the market if the discovery cost is high; 
otherwise, the consumer searches and select a brand based on information gathered 
during search. 
   
4.1.2. Consumers 
I assume there is a continuum of consumers with a size normalized to 1.  
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for the brands.  The 
heterogeneity is captured in their match value for each brand.  The match value ε is the 
amount of satisfaction the consumer receives by consuming a given brand.  The 
distribution of consumer match values is assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed F  for both brands over the interval ],[ ba∈ε .  The assumption that the 
distribution of match values is identical for each product underpins the horizontal 
characteristics of the model.  The independence assumption means a consumer is not 
able to use match value received for one brand to infer his match value for the other.  
Conditional on consuming brand k , consumer si'  indirect utility is given as 
 
  zcpyV k
i
k
i ⋅−−+= ε    
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where y is disposable income, ikε  is the match value received by consumer i for product 
k , kp is the price, c is the cost of a unit search and z is the number of searches made 
(stores visited) by the consumer before a decision is taken.  Each consumer maximizes 
the expected utility by following an optimal sequential search strategy. 
 
4.1.3. Sequential Search 
A consumer searches when either discovery cost is low or an advertisement is 
received from at least one firm.  Conditional on one of these events occurring, I now 
describe an optimal sequential search strategy. 
Consumers know there are two firms but are unaware of the extent to which they 
would like a particular brand.  One way in which a consumer may become aware of their 
match for a brand is through an advertisement received from that firm.  Otherwise, the 
consumer becomes aware of how much he likes the brand by searching.  I assume a 
sequential search behavior pattern with the consumers having perfect recall.  Perfect 
recall means a consumer never forgets his match value for a brand already searched.  
Further, I assume once the consumer incurs the cost of searching a particular brand, he 
may return to that store selling that brand at no additional cost.  However, if the 
consumer is informed about a product through advertisement, he must pay the search 
cost if he chooses to purchase the brand (since he must visit the store in order to do so).  
In this search pattern, each consumer visits at least one firm once discovery cost is low 
or an advertisement is received from at least one firm. 
Consumers rationally anticipate the price is the same for all unsearched brands; 
the gain from engaging in these costly visits is finding the brand with a higher match 
value.  Based on the distribution of match values, consumers determine a reservation 
value for the product.  This reservation value represents the minimum match value a 
consumer could realize to make the cost of another search outweigh the expected gain of 
an additional search.  This means that a consumer will stop searching (and buy from that 
firm) if he realizes a match value at least as great as his reservation value. 
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4.1.3.1 Search without Prior Information 
The reservation value for a given consumer is a function of the information 
available prior to search.  I now consider consumers who do not receive any 
advertisement (uninformed consumers).  An uninformed consumer randomly selects 
which store to visit first; without loss of generality, label the surplus gained at this store 
as )( 11 p−ε .  The consumer then decides whether to purchase brand 1 and enjoy a 
surplus of )( 11 p−ε  with certainty or pay an additional unit of search cost in order to 
sample the other store.  If the other store is sampled and the consumer gets a surplus of 
)( p−ε , the consumer only benefits from the additional search if )()( 11 pp −>− εε .  
The marginal benefit of visiting the other store as opposed to buying from the first store 
is therefore )}({ 11 pp +−− εε  if )( 11 pp +−> εε  and 0  if )( 11 pp +−≤ εε .  The 
expected benefit from searching is therefore given as }]0),([max{ 11 ppE +−− εεε .  
Define xˆ  as the match value from store 1 (net of price differential) that equates the 
marginal benefit of search with the marginal cost of search.  That is,  
 
(4.1)  cxE =− }]0),ˆ[max{(εε        
 
 It is obvious that the marginal benefit of search decreases in xˆ .  This implies 
that for )ˆ( 11 xpp >+−ε , the expected marginal benefit of searching the second store is 
less than the cost of search.  For uninformed consumers, therefore, the reservation match 
value is given as )ˆ( 1 ppx −+ ; for ppx −+> 11 ˆε , searching the expected gain in 
surplus is lower than the cost whereas for ppx −+≤ 11 ˆε  the expected gain is at least as 
great as the cost.  The optimal sequential search strategy for a consumer without prior 
information is therefore 
 
Lemma 4. Search Strategy I (uninformed consumers) 
i. Randomly select the first store to search. 
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ii. Stop searching (buy from the store) if the realized match value 
exceeds )ˆ( 1 ppx −+ ; otherwise visit the other store. 
iii. Stop at the second store if the surplus exceeded the first store; otherwise 
return to the first store and buy the product. 
 
4.1.3.2. Search with Prior Information 
I now outline the reservation value for a consumer who receives an 
advertisement from only one firm (partially informed consumer).  Without loss of 
generality, label as brand 1, the brand for which he receives an advertisement.  The 
surplus from buying brand 1 is therefore )( 11 cp −−ε since the consumer must still incur 
the search cost even if though he is informed about the product information prior to 
search.  Alternatively, the consumer may decide to visit the other store of which he has 
no prior information where he realizes a surplus )( p−ε .  The consumer’s decision of 
whether to accept firm 1’s offer or search (visit the other store) hinge critically on his 
expected benefits from searching. 
Recall from the previous discussion that if his best offer exceeds xˆ , defined in 
equation (4.1) above, then the consumer will not expect to benefit from search and will 
consequently go directly to purchase the advertised product.  This suggests, therefore, 
that the partially informed consumer will immediately purchase brand 1 if 
)ˆ( 11 cppx +−+>ε .  Once the consumer decides not to buy the advertised product 
immediately, his search strategy is identical to that of uninformed consumers.  The 
optimal sequential search strategy for a consumer with information about only one 
product is: 
 
Lemma 5. Search Strategy II (Partially Informed Consumers) 
i. Buy the advertised product if the surplus exceeds )ˆ( 1 cppx +−+ ; 
otherwise visit the other store. 
ii. Buy from the other store if the realized match value exceeds the surplus 
from the advertised product; otherwise buy the advertised product. 
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A key distinction between the strategy of uninformed consumers and partially 
informed consumers is the determination of which brand is given first consideration.  
For uninformed consumers, each store has an equal chance of being given first 
consideration first while for partially informed consumers, first consideration is given to 
the brand for which he has prior information. 
  
4.1.4. Firms 
I assume there are two firms competing in price, advertising intensity and 
information content of advertisements.  Firms produce horizontally differentiated 
products but are otherwise identical.  By horizontal differentiation I mean that consumer 
perceive no difference in the quality characteristics of each brand.  I normalize 
production costs to zero in order to focus attention to advertising costs.  The advertising 
technology is given by the twice differentiable continuous function A . 
The amount of resources needed to send advertisements to ]1,0[∈φ consumers is 
given as );( λφA  where λ is a parameter that shifts the cost curve thus controlling the 
efficiency of the technology.  I further assume that A is an increasing, convex function 
of φ with 0>λA and 0);0( =λA  such that higher values of λ  reflect less efficient 
advertising technologies and the firm does not incur any advertising expense unless an 
advertisement is disseminated. 
 
4.1.5. Equilibrium Concept 
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.  It requires that each 
firm choose strategies to maximize his own payoffs (expected profits) based on the 
firm’s beliefs about its rivals’ strategies as well as its knowledge of consumers’ search 
strategy in Stage 3.  It further requires consumers to buy a brand to maximize net 
indirect utility based on the information (if any) obtained from firms in Stage 2, as well 
as information obtained during the search process while anticipating the price charged 
by firms from which they did not receive an advertising message.  In equilibrium 
   47
expectations are met.  The Bayesian inference in this solution concept requires us to state 
how a consumer’s beliefs are updated when he comes across a price other than p at a 
particular store.  For this I assume that he will continue to anticipate a price p for brands 
yet to be searched. 
 
4.2. Symmetric Equilibrium 
To solve this game, I use backward induction that involves first solving Stage 3 
of the game and work back to Stage 1.  I focus on symmetric, pure strategy equilibria.  
The demand curve represents the solution to Stage 3.  In what follows, we solve the rest 
of the stages. 
 
4.2.1. Stage 2: Price and Advertising Level 
In this section, I determine the price and advertising level selected by each firm.  
For a given advertising regime, each firm selects },{ φp  to maximize expected profits.  
To derive an expression for expected profits, I need to derive the firm’s expected 
demand under the alternative advertising regimes. 
 
4.2.1.1. Informative Advertising Regime 
The use of informative advertising is now considered.  The consumer desires to 
know his surplus from each brand to make an informed decision.  Two pieces of 
information are needed to reveal a consumer’s surplus for a particular brand: the price 
and match value.  An informative advertisement reveals both pieces of information. 
 Whenever discovery cost is low, the consumer will become aware of the general 
product class without receiving an advertisement.  Whenever discovery cost is high, 
consumers become aware of the existence of the product if and only if they receive an 
advertisement from at least one of the firms.  Conditional on receiving an advertisement, 
consumers may search between both stores for the brand that maximizes expected utility. 
The expected demand from consumers when discovery cost is high is therefore similar to 
the expected demand when discovery costs are low.  The only difference is that a 
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measure ( )( )φφ −− 11 1  of consumers will not participate in the market when discovery 
cost is high since they do not receive an advertisement from either firm.  To model 
consumer demand under this parameterization, I modify the Duopoly version of the 
advertising model developed in Chapter III in order to explicitly model discovery cost, d. 
I measure discovery cost as a discrete value taking on a value of 0 whenever 
discovery costs are insignificant and a value of 1 otherwise.5  Each firm independently 
distributes advertising messages to a fraction of the consumers.  Each message reveals 
the consumer’s assigned match value for that product as well as the price.  The expected 
demand for firm 1’s product, given that the rival firm charges p  and φ is given as 
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5 The results reported here are unaltered using a continuous measure of discovery cost. 
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The Firm’s expected profits is given as 
 
)(),,,( 111111 φφφπ AppDp −=  
 
 Since I am seeking only symmetrical equilibrium strategies, I impose pp =1 and 
φφ =1 in the FOCs and get 
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Using the FOC given in pπ , I can write the equilibrium price as 
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1
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Substituting the expression for equilibrium price in the FOC given in φπ , the 
equilibrium advertising intensity is given implicitly given as 
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4.2.1.2. Uninformative Advertising Regime 
In this section, I derive the equilibrium under uninformative advertising.  By 
uninformative, I mean neither the price nor match value is disclosed in the advertisement 
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so the consumer has no idea of how much surplus the brand offers.  The advertisement, 
however, does alert the consumer to the existence and intended use of the general class 
of product sold in the market and this information is useful when it is costly for 
consumers to acquire the information on their own. 
 With low product discovery costs, consumers may become aware of the 
product’s existence without receiving an advertisement.  The expected demand from 
consumers who receive an advertisement is identical to the demand from consumers who 
do not receive any advertisement since these advertisements do not contain any 
information relevant to the brand selection decision.6 Whenever discovery cost is 
prohibitively high, consumers will not be aware of the existence of the product unless an 
advertisement from at least one of the firms.  Consumers who receive uninformative 
advertisements behave in an identical manner to the set of uninformed consumer 
outlined Proposition 2 for 2=n .  The firm’s expected demand under high discovery 
costs is similar to the demand under low discovery cost except for the fact that only 
consumers who receive at least one advertisement participates in the market.  The 
expected demand is given by 
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It can be verified that ( ) ]11[),( 221111 φφφ −−=== dppD and the slope of the 
demand, evaluated at the equilibrium, is given as  
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6 Uninformative advertisements informs the consumer of the intended use of the product (and that the 
product exists) but not the search characteristics of the brand. 
9 I thank Bill Neilson for subsidizing my discovery cost by directing me to the Nissan experiment. 
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Further, since )1(),( 2111
1
1 φφφφ −===∂
∂ dppD , the FOCs for the equilibrium price and 
advertising level is given as  
 
(4.4)  ( )[ ]( ){ } [ ] ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ ∫+−⋅−−
−−=
x
a
dFfxfxFd
dp
ˆ
2
2
)()(2)ˆ()ˆ(111
11
εεφ
φ     
(4.5)  
( )[ ]
( ){ } [ ] 0)()(2)ˆ()ˆ(111
)1(11
1
ˆ
2
2
4
1 =∂
∂−
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ∫+−⋅−−
−−−
φεεφ
φφ A
dFfxfxFd
dd
x
a
 
 
4.2.2. Stage 1: Information Content 
In this section, I compare the economic rents earned by firms under each 
advertising regime.  Up until now, I have been somewhat general about the functional 
form of the preference distribution F ; any log-concave distribution function is sufficient 
to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in price and 
advertising level (see Section 3.3).  Without loss of generality, therefore, I now assume a 
specific distribution for the match values and advertising technology. 
 
Assumption 3. Consumer match values are uniformly distributed F  over the 
interval ]1,0[ . 
 
Assumption 4. The cost of reaching a proportion )1,0[∈φ of the population is given 
as )1log();( φλλφ −−=A . 
 
With these simplifying assumptions, I now determine the firm’s choice of 
advertising regime by comparing the equilibrium profits earned under each alternative. 
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4.2.2.1. Informative Advertising 
Based on the previous section, the Propositions 8 and 9 can easily be verified: 
 
Proposition 8.  For low discovery cost ( 0=d ), the equilibrium price, adverting intensity 
and profits are given as: 
(4.6)  1)ˆ1( −+= xp          
(4.7)  0=φ           
(4.8)  121 )ˆ1(
−+= xILπ         
 
I now explain why there is no advertising in this equilibrium.  The only reason a 
firm advertises is to generate additional sales for its brand.  It is generally agreed that the 
increase store traffic comes from two sources.  Firstly, advertising can increase the total 
demand for the product by drawing consumers away from other industries (products).  
Secondly, advertising might lead to a redistribution of consumers among the various 
brands within an industry.  Informative advertising in my model potentially has both 
effects.  But as I explain, these effects are neutralized by certain parameter restrictions in 
my model.  In this section with low discovery costs, the size of aggregate demand is 
fixed at 1 (the size of the consumer population) and thus unaffected by advertising 
levels.  Hence the only effect of informative advertising with low discovery cost is to 
lure consumers away from the rival firm (business stealing).  It turns out that for uniform 
preferences in duopoly markets, the expected demand from consumers informed about a 
particular brand is identical to the expected demand from consumers not informed about 
the brand.  This means there is no private benefit (to the firm) from advertising and there 
will be no advertising as long as it is costly to so do.   
This is however, an artifact of the joint assumptions on the preference 
distribution and number of firms in the market; another market structure with either 
more than two firms or a non-uniform preference distribution generates a positive 
amount of advertising. 
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Proposition 9. For high discovery cost ( 1=d ), the equilibrium price, advertising 
intensity and profit are given as: 
(4.9)  ( )[ ][ ])ˆ1)(1( 112
2
2
1
x
p IH +−+
−−= φφφ
φ        
(4.10)  343 23 1 +−= zzIHφ         
 
where expressions for 1z and 2z are given in the Appendix A. 
 (4.11)  ( )[ ][ ] )1log()1()1)(ˆ1( 1181 2
22
φλφφφ
φπ −+−−++
−−≡
x
IH     
with φ  defined in equation 4.10 above. 
The equilibrium level of adverting intensity will in general be positive.  With 
high discovery costs, potential consumers do not participate unless they receive an 
advertisement from at least one of the firms.  In essence, therefore, advertising increases 
the total demand for the product class and is thus utilized in equilibrium. 
 
4.2.2.2. Uninformative Advertising 
I now use assumptions 3 and 4 to derive the expected equilibrium profit earned 
under the uninformative advertising regime.  Based on the previous section, Propositions 
10 and 11 can easily be verified: 
 
Proposition 10. Under low discovery cost ( 0=d ), the equilibrium price, advertising 
intensity and profits are given as: 
(4.12)  1)ˆ1( −+= xp          
(4.13)  0=φ           
(4.14)  121 )ˆ1(
−+≡ xULπ          
It is again apparent it is not optimal to advertise whenever discovery costs are 
low.  Unlike the case for informative advertising, this result is not an artifact of the 
uniform preference distribution and duopoly assumptions.  In my model, uninformative 
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advertisements are not expected to redistribute consumers among brands since they 
contain no brand specific information. The only benefit of uninformative advertising is 
to increase the total demand for the industry.  With low discovery costs, total demand is 
fixed at 1 and so it is not optimal to advertise so long as doing so is costly.   
 
Proposition 11. Under high discovery cost, the equilibrium price, advertising intensity 
and profits are given as: 
(4.15)  ( ) 1ˆ1 −+= xpUH          
(4.16)  )ˆ1(21 xUH +−= λφ         
(4.17)  ( ) ( ) ( )]ˆ12log[)ˆ1(21ˆ1 21121 xxxUH +++−+≡ − λλλπ     
The nature of the alternative advertising regimes is quite transparent when one 
compares the pricing strategies IHp and UHp  (equations 4.9 and 4.15 respectively).  
Equilibrium price under the informative regime is decreasing in level of advertising 
where as the equilibrium price under uninformative regime is independent of the level of 
advertising.  The intuition is that the information disclosed in informative advertisements 
places firms under more direct competition with each other and there is a tendency to 
under-cut prices.  Firms still maintain some market power because of heterogeneity in 
preferences for the products.  Under uninformative advertising, however, the 
competition between rivals is not as direct since consumers receive no brand specific 
information and will only know their surplus by visiting the stores.  The following 
results are immediate: 
 
Result 1. 
i. IHUH φφ ≥  
ii. IHUH pp ≥  
iii. IHUH ππ ≥  
Proof of Result 1. (i)  The expected increase in demand generated by a marginal increase 
in advertising intensity is the identical under informative and uninformative advertising 
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regimes [ )1(21 φ−d ].  Since (ii) shows that the price received under uninformative 
advertising is at least as great as the price under informative advertising, it implies the 
marginal benefit of advertising under uninformative advertising is at least as great as the 
marginal benefit under informative advertising hence IHUH φφ ≥ . (ii) Suppose not.  This 
means IHUH pp < .  This implies 
[ ] ( )[ ]221121 11)ˆ1)(1()ˆ1( φφφφ −−+−+<+ −− xx  
⇒ [ ] ( )[ ]22 11)ˆ1()ˆ1)(1(2 φφφφ −−+<+−+ xx .  Replacing )1(2)1(1 22 φφφφ −+≡−− , I 
obtain xˆ1< , a contradiction since 1ˆ =< bx .  Hence IHUH pp ≥ . 
(iii) [ ])1log()1log( IHUHIHIHUHUHIHUH DpDp φφλππ −−−+−≡− .  By Envelope 
Theorem, 0)1log()1log()( ≤−−−=∂
−∂ IHUHIHUH φφλ
ππ since IHUH φφ ≥ .  But 
),0( λλ∈ with 1)]ˆ1(2[ −+≡ xλ .  It is readily verified that ( ) 0=− =λλππ IHUH .  This 
implies that 0)( ≥− IHUH ππ for all λλ < .     Q.E.D.   
If I make the tie-breaking rule that a firm will choose to exclude information if it 
is otherwise indifferent between including and excluding information, then result (iii) 
tells me that as long as discovery cost is high, the unique pure strategy advertising 
equilibrium in my model is },,{ UHUHpU φ . 
 
4.3. Equilibrium Properties 
Result (iii.) above shows that uninformative advertising regime weakly 
dominates informative advertising regimes.  This finding is consistent with the 
preponderance of empirical studies that find most advertisements to be uninformative.  
Since both informative and uninformative advertisements are observed empirically, I 
relax the tie-breaking rule to further explore the model when result (iii) holds with strict 
equality; this occurs when the advertising technology is least efficient.  The results 
above show firms never advertise whenever discovery cost is low ( 0== ULIL φφ ).  I 
subsequently restrict my analysis to the case when discovery cost is high ( 1=d ).  I now 
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present the following comparative static results that may be readily verified using 
expressions in Proposition 11: 
 
Result 2. 
iv. 0,0 <∂
∂>∂
∂
λ
φφ UHUH
c
 
v. 0,0 =∂
∂>∂
∂
λ
UHUH p
c
p  
vi. 0,0 <∂
∂>∂
∂
λ
ππ UHUH
c
 
 
4.3.1. Least Efficient Advertising Technology (LEAT) 
In this section, I focus on key equilibrium patterns in my model as 
1
2
1 )ˆ1( −+≡→ xλλ .  I single out this extreme case because it is the only instance in 
which my model predicts the use of both regimes in equilibrium, i.e., there is a mixed 
strategy equilibrium in advertising regimes.  I start with the equilibrium strategies under 
the uninformative advertising regime.  Using Proposition 11, 0→UHφ  as λλ → . Result 
1 (i.) shows it must also be true that 0→IHφ .  Using equation (4.9), by L’ Hopital’s 
Rule  
   
 
( )[ ][ ] UHIH pxxp =+→+−+ −−= )ˆ1( 1)ˆ1)(1( 112
2
2
1
φφφ
φ
as 0→φ  
The above expression shows that under LEAT, the price strategy is identical 
under each advertising regime.  To conclude the characterization of equilibrium for this 
special case, I need only compare that FOC for advertising intensity under each regime 
and note that they are identical for UHIH pp = .  This implies that IHUH φφ → as λλ → . 
This shows that only an extremely small number of consumers observe 
advertisements with this least efficient advertising technology in a highly concentrated 
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market.  Since I am considering high discovery cost, this also implies only these 
consumers participate in the market.  The following results may also be readily verified:  
 
Result 3. As 121 )ˆ1(
−+≡→ xλλ , 
vii.  ( ) 0→− IHUH ππ   
viii.  0,0 →→ IHUH ππ   
ix. 122 →= IU rr   
(x)  2111 →= IU rr   
 Results (ix) and (x) track very important accounting ratios.  The advertising: 
profit ratio (result ix) shows that for every dollar paid out in advertising expenditure, one 
dollar accrues to the firm as profit.  The advertising to sales ratio (result x) shows that 
for every dollar paid out to advertise the product, two dollars are generated in sales 
revenue. 
The analyses in the previous sections allow me to derive empirically testable 
hypothesis that I confront with observed events in the automobile market as well as data 
from an empirical study of information content in television advertising by Resnik and 
Stern (1977). 
 
4.4. The Infiniti Experiment9 
From Section 4.1, it is clear uninformative advertisements are only used by firms 
whenever the discovery cost associated with the product is high (Propositions 8 through 
11).  A discussion of the factors that determine the magnitude of the discovery cost is 
outside the scope of this paper.  However, since uninformative advertisements 
essentially inform consumers to the existence of the brand, it is reasonable to assume 
that the discovery costs associated with established (known) brands are relatively low 
where as the discovery costs associated with newly introduced brands are relatively high. 
With this in mind, limited support of our theoretical description of the 
importance of discovery costs on information content of advertisements is provided by 
   58
the advertising campaign used by the Nissan Corporation to introduce the Infiniti model 
in the United States. 
An account of this campaign strategy is provided in Sternthal (2005).  The 
automobile industry provides a reasonable setting (but not ideal, as discussed later) to 
test the usefulness of the model since consumers typically purchase only one car (unit 
demand) and the automobile industry is somewhat concentrated. 
 In 1990, Nissan introduced the Infiniti automobile to the United States.  The 
Infiniti was a luxury vehicle designed to compete with known (established) luxury 
model of Mercedes-Benz.  At the same time, the Toyota Corporation also introduced the 
Lexus model as its luxury line. Toyota’s advertisements provided consumers with 
images, features and availability of the Lexus.  Nissan’s strategy was unconventional in 
the sense that no information, other than the availability of the Infiniti, is conveyed in 
any of the advertisements; not even an image of the Infiniti appeared in the television 
advertisements.  The advertising campaign was more successful for Nissan in the sense 
that consumers found the advertisements to be more memorable than advertisements for 
the Lexus.  Despite the appeal of the uninformative advertisements, the Lexus sold more 
units.  The appeal of the uninformative advertisements was lost very shortly after the 
cars were introduced and Nissan eventually began to produce informative 
advertisements.10  The difference between the advertising strategies used to launch the 
luxury models provides a natural experiment to assess the predictions of the model as it 
points out how the information content in advertisements is affected by changes in 
discovery costs. 
 
4.4.1. Explained Results 
I now relate these events to the theoretical model outlined in the previous 
sections.  Toyota used informative advertisements while Nissan’s used uninformative 
advertisements.  It is clear from Section 4.3 that uninformative advertisements are used 
                                                 
10 Sternthal (2005) shows that Infiniti’s advertisements were ranked as third most memorable at the time 
the models were about to be introduced but slipped to ten most memorable a few months after 
introduction. 
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when discovery cost is high and only informative advertisements are observed whenever 
discovery cost is low.  A discussion of the determinants of discovery cost is outside the 
scope of this paper.  However, it seems reasonable to conjecture that a product’s life 
cycle is a determinant of the discovery cost associated with the product; all other things 
constant, the discovery cost for product should be higher earlier in its life cycle (newly 
introduced) than later in its life cycle (establish product).11 It is argued therefore, that the 
uninformative advertisements which launched the Infiniti were used when discovery cost 
was high; consistent with model predictions.  After a few months, Nissan switched to an 
informative advertising regime.  This is also consistent with the model since the Infiniti 
would no longer be considered a new good after a few months in the sense that word-of-
mouth from person who viewed the initial advertisements would lower the discovery 
costs for consumers who did not view the initial advertising campaign. 
 
4.4.2. Unexplained Results 
There is, however, at least one inconsistency with the Infiniti experiment and the 
theoretical model.  It is shown in Section 4.3 that the use of an uninformative advertising 
strategy is not dominated by the use of a fully informative strategy.  The model therefore 
can not explain why Lexus sold more units that Infiniti and why Nissan switched to 
informative advertising.  I can think of at least two reasons for the divergence between 
the predictions and the empirical results.  The first reason might be advertisements are 
not fully informative in the automobile industry given that “test drives” are a prominent 
feature in marketing cars.  The use of “test drives” by dealers indicates that 
advertisements do not fully capture the likely driving experience of a given model 
vehicle.  This study does not allow for the transmission of partial information and it 
could very well be that advertisements with partial information dominate uninformative 
advertisements. 
                                                 
11 The discovery cost for existing goods may be low because consumers may learn of these goods through 
word-of-mouth from other consumers who may have purchased the goods.  All other things constant, 
discovery costs for new products will be higher since the good is yet to be consumed by anyone, by 
definition, and so the word-of moth option is not available.  
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A second reason for the divergence between the theoretical model and empirical 
results is that Lexus and Infiniti might not be purely horizontally differentiated as 
assumed in the model, i.e., consumers may perceive Lexus to be a higher quality luxury 
vehicle.  In theoretical models of vertical differentiation, the higher quality product 
always earns greater rents and this would explain why Lexus out-performs Infiniti.12 
 
4.5. The Usefulness of Content Analysis 
In what follows, I confront my theoretical model with an empirical study of the 
informativeness of television commercials by Resnik and Stern (1977).  Data were 
collected during April 1975.  A total of 378 commercials from the three major television 
networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) were recorded.  The information content of each 
commercial is evaluated using fourteen criteria reflecting product characteristics.  The 
results of their study are reproduced in Table 1. 
 
4.5.1. Data Issues 
There are a couple of reasons it might be inappropriate to use the data in Resnik 
and Stern (1977) to evaluate the relevance of my theoretical model.  The first concern is 
the class of products that are advertised.  In my model, I assume consumers have discrete 
inelastic individual demand.  This means consumers purchased one unit of the good and 
select only one brand to consume.  This form of demand is not associated with any of the 
product categories listed in the table.  The representative consumer and the CES models 
of individual demand that allow more that one brand to be purchased and consumed in 
variable units appears to more appropriately represent the product classes listed in the 
table. 
                                                 
12 For studies in pure vertical differentiation, see Shaked and Sutton (1982), Lehmann-Grube (1997) and 
Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995).  For studies with both horizontally and vertically differentiated 
products, see Economides (1989, 1993), Neven and Thisse (1989) and Degryse and Irmen (2001). 
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TABLE 1 
Informativeness Based on Advertisement Content 
 
Sample/ Condition Number 
Evaluated 
Informative Advertisements 
(%) 
 
   
Total Sample of Advertisements 378 49.2% 
   
Total Weekday Advertisements 189 50.3% 
     Weekday Morning Advertisements 63 57.1% 
     Weekday Afternoon Advertisements 63 33.3% 
     Weekday Evening Advertisements 63 60.3% 
   
Total Weekend Advertisements 189 48% 
     Weekend Morning Advertisements 63 34.9% 
     Weekend Afternoon Advertisements 63 49.2% 
     Weekend Evening Advertisements 63 60.3% 
   
Total Morning Advertisements 126 46% 
Total Afternoon Advertisements 126 41.3% 
Total Evening Advertisements 126 60.3% 
   
Food Advertisements 144 45.8% 
Institutional Advertisements 24 75% 
Personal Care Product Advertisements 93 39.8% 
Laundry and Household Product Advertisements 52 46.2% 
Hobby, Toy and Transportation Advertisements 29 69% 
“Other” Product Advertisement 36 58.3% 
 
Source: Resnik and Stern (1977, Exhibit 2). 
Note: Television commercials are classified by Resnik and Stern as informative if they contained at least 
one of the following fourteen (14) informational cues: price or value, quality, performance, components or 
contents, availability, special offers, taste, nutrition, packaging or shape, guarantees or warranties, safety, 
independent research, company research or new ideas. 
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However, an important result in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) suggests 
that my model predictions are robust to the specification of individual consumer 
demand.  They show under certain conditions (which are satisfied in my specification), 
discrete individual demand (which I explicitly model) and CES individual demand yield 
identical aggregated demand functions.  Since my results are based on the aggregate 
demand and not individual demand, I expect them be robust to the modeling of 
individual consumer demand. 
A second concern is my model is derived for industries with two single product 
firms.  A look at Table 1 suggests that this might not be the case for the product classes 
reported in the study.  The product list consists of industries with more than two rivals 
and multi-product firms with a given industry.  This is especially true for Food and 
Personal Care Products.  My hope is these industries are highly concentrated with a 
couple of dominant players despite having many firms.  A good example of such an 
industry is the Cola market that has many firms but dominated primarily by Pepsi and 
Coke.  With these caveats in mind, I now confront the data. 
In the pursuant discussion, I assume my theoretical model accurately describes 
the actual markets from which the sample is drawn.  I attempt to reconcile the observed 
pattern in the sample with my model in one of two ways. In the first instance, I highlight 
a classification scheme that could have induced bias in the sample.  I then discuss the 
nature of the bias and show that the sample becomes more consistent with the 
predictions of my theoretical model as the bias is corrected. In the second instance, I 
assume the sample is indeed measured without bias and impute the parameter 
restrictions in my model that are required to generate such a sample.  
 A prediction of my model is that uninformative advertising weakly dominates 
informative advertising.  That is, when firms decide to advertise, the expected rents 
earned from uninformative advertising exceeds the rents from informative advertising 
when advertising technology is sufficiently efficient and expected rents are the same 
under both regimes when the advertising technology is sufficiently inefficient.  My 
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model then predicts that uninformative advertisements should be most prevalent in the 
sample. 
The information in Table 1 shows that 49.2 percent of the commercials in the 
sample were evaluated as informative.  Such a big proportion of informative 
commercials arouses concerns since it lends little support to my prediction that firms 
weakly prefer uninformative commercials to uninformative ones.  However, my 
concerns are lifted upon examining how the commercials in Table 1 were classified.  In 
Table 1, a commercial is determined to be informative if it included at least one of the 
fourteen information cues used by consumers in making purchasing decision (the 
information cues are listed directly below Table 1).  In my model, fully informative 
commercials would be those with more than one cue and so the sample in Table 1 might 
have an upward bias.  Resnik and Stern (1997) point out that if the criterion for 
informativeness was changed to having at least two information cues, the proportion of 
informed commercials would be only 16 percent.   Further, if the criterion were for the 
commercial to have at least three information cues, then only 1 percent of the 
commercials would be evaluated as informative.  These lower percentages provide 
stronger support for my model. 
My model does not allow partial information to be transmitted in commercials so 
I can not definitively argue whether partially informative commercials should be 
classified as either informative or uninformative.  However, grouping them as 
uninformative seems to be more consistent with the prediction of my model.  Indeed, I 
can see how partial product information might be of no value to consumers.  In my 
model, sending only price information in commercials is of no informative value since 
consumers rationally anticipate this price in equilibrium.  In that sense a commercial that 
reveals only the price would be classified as uninformative in my model. 
Let us set aside the potential data measurement error in Table 1 and assume that 
the informativeness of commercials is accurately captured.  I now show that the data 
presented in Table 1 is consistent features of my model under specific market 
parameters.  My analysis in Section 4.2 shows that the expected profits are identical 
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under each advertising regime once the advertising technology is least efficient. 
Indifference between the two regimes means that I would expect one half of the sample 
to be informative commercials, conditional on using a least efficient advertising 
technology. Thus the sample value of 49.2 percent is remarkably close to the predictions 
of my model.  If I trust that my model is correct, therefore, I must infer that television 
was a highly inefficient means of advertising in April 1975. 
Despite the fact that 49.2 percent of all commercials in Table 1 are informative, 
there is a high variability across the six product class categories ranging from a low of 
39.8 percent for Personal Care Products to a high of 75 percent for Institutional services.  
As pointed out, this variability might be induced by small sample biases within a couple 
of the categories.  The general rule of thumb in statistics is a sample size of at least 30 is 
needed to avoid small sample bias.  Once you ignore the results for Institutional category 
(with a sample of 24 commercials) and Hobby, Toy and Transportation category (with a 
sample size of 29), the proportion of informative commercials in the other four product 
classes are all within 10 percentage points of the hypothesized number of 50 percent.   
While the variability in the proportion of informative commercials might just be 
reflecting sample biases in the data, variability in the number of commercials within 
each product class might have greater economic significance.  The equilibrium 
advertising intensity in equation (4.16) is found to be dependent on both the advertising 
and search cost parameters.  Since the advertising technology is constant in the sample 
(only television advertisements are considered), observed variability in the sample must 
be reflecting differences in the search costs across the product classes.  I showed in 
result (iv.) that the equilibrium advertising intensity increases with search costs.  I can 
therefore use this information to rank the relative cost of searching among different 
brands among the different product classes.  My ranking of search cost, from highest to 
lowest would therefore be: (i.)Food, (ii.)Personal Care, (iii.)Laundry and Household 
Product, (iv.)Hobby, Toy and Transportation, (v.)“other” products (vi.) and Institutional. 
Of course, it would be preferable to have an independent measure of the relative 
search costs within the product classes.  Failing that, if I use “time spent shopping” as a 
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proxy for search costs then my results seems reasonable; individuals spend more time 
shopping for food and personal care items than say laundry and household products.  
I have presented, two competing ways in which one could reconcile my model 
with the empirical study of Resnik and Stern (1977).  The first implies that television is a 
relatively inefficient medium of information dissemination.  While this seems plausible 
given that many homes might not have had access to television in the mid 1970s, I find 
this implication less tenable for the following reason.  Stern and Resnik (1991) 
replicated their earlier study and classify the information content of television viewed in 
1986.  They conclude there is no statistical difference in the proportion of informative 
commercials reported in the 1975 and 1986 samples; this would imply that television 
was just as inefficient in 1986 as in 1975.  There have been rapid technological 
advancements in consumer electronic devices since the 1970s.  The commensurate free 
fall in the price of Personal Computers, Televisions, Radios and other electronic devices, 
means that many consumers would have owned television sets by the mid 1980s.  It is 
unlikely that television would remain such an inefficient means of disseminating 
information to consumers in 1986. 
I therefore find it more likely that the informativeness of television commercials 
was inaccurately measured in the empirical studies.  Indeed it seems likely that 
consumer’s surplus from a given product would depend on more than one dimension in 
the product’s characteristics space. 
I argue that discovery cost should also be considered when evaluating the 
informative value of advertisements.  This should complement extant studies in the 
marketing literature that have focused on advertising content. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Previous theoretical studies in advertising have considered either advertising 
level or the content of advertising; this is the first paper to consider both dimensions.  
The results from this research shed some light on widespread use of seemingly 
uninformative advertisements in highly concentrated markets.  I have demonstrated the 
   66
use of advertisements which do not provide any brand-specific information conveys 
other valuable information to consumers whenever discovery cost is sufficiently high.  I 
have shown distributing advertisements without any product specific information weakly 
dominate those with complete brand specific information.  This supports the empirical 
observations that informative advertisements are not as widely used as uninformative 
ones. 
The model offers predictions about the information content of advertisements 
that I confront with empirical data from highly concentrated markets.  Firstly, my study 
shows uninformative advertisements will never be used in duopolies with low discovery 
costs.  Secondly, it shows that whenever informative advertisements are observed in 
markets with highly inefficient advertising technology, the advertising expenditure 
equals profits. 
One obvious limitation of the study in this chapter is the restricted attention to 
duopoly market structures with respect to incentives to provide brand specific 
information; it would be interesting to see whether these results are relevant in less 
concentrated markets.  Another shortcoming is the discrete nature in which the 
information is treated in this chapter.  I assume that the information disclosed in 
advertisements provides the consumer with either the complete (brand specific) 
information he requires or no information at all.  Another extension of this research 
would model situations in which firms disclose partial information in their 
advertisements, consistent with observed practices and the research of Anderson and 
Renault (2004).  Notwithstanding, the chapter represents a useful first step at analyzing 
the incentives of oligopolistic firms to exclude product specific information from 
advertisements without influencing consumer preferences. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Decision-making is the central theme of any economic analysis.  Although most 
analyses focus on explaining how agents behave in certain environments (deriving 
equilibrium strategies), the information used by these agents in the decision-making 
process is of no less importance.  The obvious question then becomes how to model 
information as an intermediate good generated by the market.  In this dissertation, I 
argue there are two means through which information flows in a market: information 
dissemination and information acquisition. 
Information dissemination reflects the fact that there are incentives for those with 
the relevant information to provide it to uninformed agents.  Similarly, information 
acquisition reflects the fact that there are incentives for uninformed agents to take steps 
to gather the relevant information relevant to the decision-making process.  One needs 
only to think of information dissemination as the supply of information and information 
acquisition as the demand for information to realize that a market characterized by 
imperfect information can not be fully understood unless both channels of information 
are explicitly considered.  To demonstrate this point, I analyze a differentiated product 
market with imperfectly informed consumers. 
The main result of chapter III reconciles the modern view of advertising with the 
theory of monopolistic competition. I show advertising can be a pro-competitive tool 
that increases the substitutability among products while allowing firms maintain market 
power in the limit as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large.  This is an important 
contribution to the debate on the role of advertising.  I have shown under informative 
advertising, firms maintain market power in the limit if the initial effort to disseminate 
information is costly whereas firms will lose all market power if this initial effort is 
costless. Hopefully, this chapter has now moved the discussion of the source of market 
power in monopolistically competitive markets from the role of advertising (informative 
vs. persuasive) to the nature of the advertising technology. 
   68
Chapter III has also highlighted the dominant role played by advertising 
technology in determining the equilibrium market outcome.  I have shown this 
asymmetric effect is robust consumer search and heterogeneity in product 
characteristics. 
In Chapter IV, I shed some light on widespread use of seemingly uninformative 
advertisements in highly concentrated markets.  I demonstrate that the use of 
advertisements which do not provide any brand-specific information conveys other 
valuable information to consumers whenever discovery cost for the product is 
sufficiently high.  The true role (information value) of these seemingly uninformative 
advertisements is only revealed by modeling information acquisition. 
One obvious limitation of this study is the discrete nature of the information 
disseminated to consumers.  I assume that the information disclosed in advertisements 
provides the consumer with either the complete information or no information at all.  A 
useful extension of this research would model situations in which firms disclose partial 
information in their advertisements, consistent with observed practices and the research 
of Anderson and Renault (2004).  Notwithstanding, the research should convince 
economists that both channels of information transmission should be explicitly modeled 
whenever attempting to explain any feature within markets characterized by imperfect 
information. 
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Proof of Proposition 9. 
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=−−−⋅+−+
−−
φ
λφφφφ
φ
x
.  Rearranging gives 
0)2)ˆ1(4()ˆ45(4 23 =−−+−+− xx λλφφ .  To solve this cubic equation, make the 
substitution 
(A7) 
3
4+= yφ   
This yields a new equation  
03 =++ βαyy  with )ˆ4( 31 xλα +−≡ , 3
ˆ16
27
2)ˆ1(4 xx λλβ −−+≡ . 
The only root I am interested in is given by 
3
2
3
11 zzy −=  where 
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36
27433 2
1
βαβ ++−=z and 
36
2743 2
2
βαβ ++−=z  .  Recover the solution for 
φ by substituting the expression for 1y  into equation (A7).     Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX B 
I now show that firm 1’s expected demand from partially informed consumers, 
given that he anticipates all other firms to charge p , is given as 
(B1) [ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ∫−+∫+∫= Ε∈−Ε∈Ε∈+ 321 )()()(),( 11 εεε εεεεεε dgrn rLdgdgLppD rrr   
  
with },,{ 1 nεεε K= , njbaj ,,1],,[ K=∈ε and ∏= =
n
j
jfg
1
)()( εε is the joint density 
function of match values. 
where,  
 
} ˆ and  )(max:{ 11,1111 cpxppp jMjj r +−>−−>−=Ε +∈≠ εεεε , 
and  ˆ and  )(max:{ 11,1112 cpxppp jMjj r +−<−−>−=Ε +∈≠ εεεε , 
)}(max 11 pcp sMs r −>−− +∉ εε , 
and  ˆ and )(max  :{
,3
cpxppp kjMjkjk r +−<−−>−=Ε −∈≠ εεεε
}},{max 11,1 ppcp sMssk r −−<−− −∉≠ εεε  
Equation (B1) represents firm 1’s expected demand from consumers who are 
informed about r products (uninformed about rn − ).  The expected demand from a 
consumer depends on whether or not the consumer is informed about firm 1’s product. 
+
rM represents the set of products that are advertised to the consumers with the 
)(+ superscript indicating that firm 1 is among the advertised products. −rM represents 
the set of advertised products where the )(− superscript indicates that that firm 1 is not 
among the advertised products. 
The expression in the first set of square brackets represents demand from 
consumers who are informed about firm 1’s product. The first term in this expression 
represents the demand from consumers who buy firm 1’s product directly without 
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searching.  This group of consumers is capture in the set 1Ε . The definition of 1Ε above 
shows that two criteria must be jointly met for consumers to buy product 1 without 
searching. These r  products are in direct competition with each other since consumers 
are fully informed about their surplus each.  The first criterion ensures that firm 1 is the 
best offer for these consumers among the products they are informed about.  The second 
criterion follows directly from the consumer’s sequential search strategy (outlined in 
Section 3.2) which dictates that the consumer buy the advertised product directly if 
cppx +−+> 11 ˆε . 
The set 2Ε gives the set of consumer types who are informed about product 1 but 
buys only after searching the other products.  The definition of the set 2Ε  shows that 
three criteria must be jointly met for consumers who are informed about product 1 to 
purchase the product after searching the other stores.  The first criterion states that firm 1 
must represent the best offer among the products the consumers are informed about.  The 
second criterion follows from the consumer’s search strategy and ensures that the best 
offer is sufficiently low that the consumer expects to gain additional surplus from 
searching the other )( rn − products.  Once the consumer decides to search, the consumer 
will only buy product 1 if the surplus from brand 1, )( 11 cp −−ε exceeds the surplus 
from a product searched, )( ps −ε .  The search cost associated with product 1 will only 
be incurred if the consumer decides to purchase (and hence visit) firm 1.  The search cost 
associated with unadvertised products are sunk at the time of decision since it is incurred 
before the consumers acquires the information and so is not considered by the consumer. 
The third criterion stipulates that consumers will only buy product 1 when the surplus 
from firm 1 (net of search cost) exceeds the surplus of each unadvertised product. 
The expression in the second pair of square brackets represents the demand from 
−
rL consumers who are not informed about product 1.  Since firm 1 is not among the 
products advertised to these consumers, only these consumers that search could possibly 
buy product 1.  The set 3Ε  represents the consumer types who reject the best offer from 
the set of advertised products (brand k ) and search for a better offer among the 
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unadvertised brands.  The first two conditions in the definition of 3Ε  provide the 
condition under which search takes place for each of the r advertised brands and the 
third condition ensures that one of the )( rn − unadvertised brands is purchased.  Since 
there are r  advertised products and each of the )( rn − unadvertised brands has an equal 
chance of being selected, I determine the demand for firm 1 by applying the factor 
rn
r
− . 
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